


JPRS 78405

29 June 1981

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2355



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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29 June 1981

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No. 2355

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LIBYAN-MAURITANIAN MILITARY TREATIES DEPLORED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 16 Apr 81 pp 1, 3

[Article by Mohamed Idrissi Kaitouni: "A Chadian-Style 'Merger'"]

[Text] The Mauritanian prime minister's visit to Tripoli officially sanctioned the Nouakchott government's surrender to Libyan supremacy and marked a dangerous turning point in the history of that country, whose future is now mortgaged and exposed to serious dangers because of the Libyan seizure, also assured by the military treaties concluded between the two governments at the time of that visit.

By virtue of those treaties, Libya is militarily committed to Mauritania, which has become a proving ground for the Libyan Army and a base available to Tripoli for implementing its annexationist and expansionist plans.

Libya also did not wait long to ship large quantities of arms and munitions to Nouadhibou, not on the pretext of protecting Mauritania, but for the very specific purpose of transforming its territory into a base for launching attacks against the Moroccan Sahara.

It was also the dream of Libyan leaders, who have continued to step up their operations and plots, not only to control the POLISARIO mercenaries but to find for them an area of operations favorable for launching attacks against Morocco.

Qadhafi's proposal to the Mauritanian prime minister to "merge" with the mercenaries is explained by the expansionist aims of Tripoli, which means outright annexation by merger.

The example of Chad is edifying in this regard and shows what Libya means by "unity" and "merger."

Willingly or not, the Mauritanian leaders have therefore cast their country into the lion's den and have put it in an awkward position that is likely to forfeit its independence and sovereignty.

In view of these dangerous developments in the situation and the turn which events have taken, observers are wondering what position will be adopted by Algerian leaders, who with time are losing the trump card which they held in their hands, since the mercenaries are gradually passing under Libyan control and since Mauritanian officials

seem more attracted by Libyan petrodollars, distributed with a generosity equaled only by Tripoli's thinly veiled ambition to bring Mauritania under its control.

The current problem is one of determining the Algerian reaction following Bneijara's visit to Tripoli and Nouakchott's shift toward Libya. Will Algeria be willing to admit its defeat by Tripoli in the "secret" war which the two countries are waging to dominate Mauritania and the mercenaries?

The answer will not be long in coming and will surely bring unpleasant surprises for Mauritanian government leaders, who will see their country transformed into a combat zone between Algerians and Libyans either indirectly--by the mercenaries as intermediaries--or directly, because of the fact that both countries have shipped arms there and also have important logistic bases there.

For the time being and despite Algiers' substantial aid to Nouakchott, particularly right after the abortive coup d'etat of 16 March (establishment of an airlift for shipping arms, sending experts and instructors, etc.), Libya has a clear berth and will not hesitate to use the means to bring Mauritania under its wing.

Thus the Libyan threat will not just be limited to Mauritania, but will clearly take shape against Algeria itself, as required by rivalry.

Qadhafi has of course called for the establishment of an anti-Moroccan "pact" to include Mauritania, the mercenaries and Algeria in addition to Libya, but that proposal cannot conceal the greedy desires of Tripoli, which seeks, under a unionist pretext, to extend its authority to North Africa, the Sahel and the greater Sahara.

For Qadhafi, the end justifies the means and today's ally can become tomorrow's enemy.

Didn't he state publicly that he was ready to aid Morocco militarily to liberate its Sahara and now today he is one of the leading supporters of the enemies of our territorial integrity?

Let those who believe in Qadhafi's words be cautious and consider them seriously before committing themselves to a venture with no tomorrow.

As for Morocco, it will not allow itself to be intimidated by such moves, knowing for a fact that no force in the world will break down its faith and determination. In crossing our borders, the aggressors are digging their own graves in advance and signing their own death certificates.

And there are plenty of examples. The resounding victory by the Royal Armed Forces at Gueltat Zemmour is very revealing, just to mention this recent exploit.

But what is deplorable is that Mauritanian government leaders are playing into Tripoli's hands and are serving the interest of imperialism and neocolonialism.

We will leave it to history to judge those who are dividing the ranks of Arabs and Moslems and spreading discord and increasing sources of tension.

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BOUCETTA DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH MAURITANIA, SAHARA SITUATION

Rabat L'OPINION in French 13 Apr 81 pp 1, 3

[Interview with M'Hamed Boucetta, Moroccan Minister of State in Charge of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, by Jean Wolf; date and place not specified]

[Text] QUESTION: Everyone is familiar with the accusations made against Morocco by Mauritania and also Algeria following the tragic events which have occurred in northwest Africa. Under these circumstances, we wanted to interview Mr M'Hamed Boucetta, Moroccan minister of state in charge of foreign affairs and cooperation. May we ask you for an analysis following several days of commentary on all aspects of this matter?

ANSWER: In regard to our relations with Mauritania, you know that we have always tried to maintain an optimum level of cooperation and friendship, as well as good neighborliness. The accusations made against Morocco, which you have just recalled, are absolutely devoid of any basis. To provide an analysis, I believe that I must first point out that one week before those events occurred, there was an escalation in the tone of the accusations concerning Morocco's intention to intervene in Mauritanian affairs. Since then, and this is even more significant, a whole suspect operation has been noted: shipments of equipment, a very active airlift between Benghazi and Tindouf and unusual troop deployments in northern Mauritania. Under these circumstances, wouldn't the accusations made against Morocco be only a camouflage tactic to conceal some operation being prepared against us?

In any case, I can say that it is one of Morocco's principles not to intervene in the internal affairs of its neighbors and Morocco has always fully respected this principle, especially during this difficult period. You may recall that at one time we had more than 10,000 soldiers in Mauritania and that we did not take action at any time, even when the president of the republic was deposed.

And yet that would have been possible, since we could have given a broad interpretation to the defense agreements linking us with that country. We therefore reject outright all of these accusations, which we contend are without any basis in fact.

QUESTION: Mr Minister, let us be frank. The situation has changed since 10 July 1978, when Mr Mokhtar Ould Daddah, Mauritania's founder, was deposed. And in view of the present situation, it can be said that Morocco had every interest in the collapse of the current government, which has not shown a great deal of sympathy

for your country, which accepted the arrival of more and more POLISARIO delegations and which seemed to be moving close to Algeria every week ....

ANSWER: In our opinion, Mauritania is not represented by its government. The people of Mauritania are our partner and if the government in question represents them, in our opinion it is a normal partner for cooperation to proceed in a context of good neighborliness. Therefore, it is important to us, first of all, in our own interest, that stability prevail, that there should be a good understanding of our mutual relations and it is in that sense that I reiterated that our intervention in Mauritanian internal affairs is unthinkable.

QUESTION: You told me earlier that rather you were the one with something to fear. Well, what is to be feared: an attack originating from Tindouf, or with another base being established in Mauritania, an offensive being carried out from those two bases at the same time and taking the south of Morocco in a pincer movement?

ANSWER: We fear nothing. We simply note that preparations are being made, that there are unusual movements, that an escalation is taking place and finally, that gratuitous accusations are being made against our country. We will defend ourselves as we have defended ourselves, for more than 5 years, against the attacks to which we have been subjected. We have amply demonstrated that unity around the king, for the defense of the nation, is intact. But we are convinced that "something" is underway and we are ready to retaliate against any attack, regardless of its origin.

QUESTION: It seems that the POLISARIO Front is presently split between a pro-Algerian wing and a perhaps more extremist pro-Libyan wing. From which side is something to be feared?

ANSWER: We have always tried to make the world understand the confusion prevailing in such mercenary groups. This confusion is now at its worst, especially since the unity of the so-called Saharan people has been disputed by the most important international organizations. The OAU has refused to recognize the legitimacy of what is called the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic. You have subsequently observed the change on the diplomatic level, both in the case of the position taken by the Nonaligned Nations in New Delhi and the recent position adopted in Addis Ababa, not to mention the European Parliament's decision to declare that there is no Saharan people, but that there are organized groups supported by Algeria, which is therefore their sanctuary, their starting point, and that these groups are armed by Libya, as everyone knows, and that this represents a situation which must end. Therefore, that is all that is involved and if there is something to be feared, it is from Algeria or Libya, but by no means from a so-called nation recognized by no one, including the League of Arab States, even less than the others.

QUESTION: Mr Minister, you mentioned the report of the Irishman, Patrick Lalor, which has just been adopted by a large majority of the European Parliament. What conclusions do you draw from this and what prospects will emerge, in your opinion?

ANSWER: The first conclusion which we draw is that a responsible organization, responsible in a way that cannot be disputed by any public opinion group whatsoever, has noted and pointed out certain truths which we have continually repeated for more than 5 years: that this tension is artificially created, that this is a conflict



between Algeria and Morocco, which are the principal parties involved, that the Saharan people are sheer fantasy and invention, that the occupation of our territory by the POLISARIO Front is also a concept without any basis, and finally that there is good reason for putting a permanent end to this existing destabilization and unlimited agitation in the area, which are in the interest of no one.

That is what we have concluded. Let us repeat that this is only the expression of certain truths which we have worn ourselves out repeating and which have been stated in a fundamental, serious and pertinent manner by the European Parliament, which is an important organization.

And in our opinion, in view of the special relations between Europe and North Africa--past, present and future relations--this European Parliament is perhaps the place where the public opinion of peoples with such direct contacts, and who have had significant responsibilities to North Africa, is in a position to properly understand the actual situation. That of course offers prospects for the future, with a view to more intense cooperation and complementarity for the defense of our own security. Because it is a matter, let's not forget, of our common security: European security begins in North Africa. It is a question of resisting together all factional trends, whether on an ideological level or tomorrow, perhaps, trends that will take other forms, possibly military ....

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## ARABS SEEK FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION IN ITALY

London 8 DAYS in English 30 May 81 pp 34, 35

[Text]

THE ARAB ECONOMIC presence in Italy, which is growing daily, may be further strengthened by developments within Montedison, one of the world's leading chemical, pharmaceutical and plastics groups.

Through an operation paradoxically launched by Socialist Minister for State and Mixed Industries Gianni de Michelis, the 17 per cent public stake in Montedison will be sold to private interests. Buyers may include Arab financiers. Despite the tight secrecy surrounding the initiative, 8 DAYS has learnt from Montedison sources that an Arab role is strongly sought.

The 17 per cent in question was previously held by the state oil organisation ENI and Italy's mixed industries holding IRI and is now being sold to a group led by Italian financier Enrico Cuccia's Mediobanca, consisting of four leading industrial groups — Fiat, Pirelli, Bonomi (real estate) and Orlando (steel).

Montedison's privatisation, and the increase of its capital from \$355m to around \$1bn, should also involve either a new and as yet unnamed Arab investor, or Saudi financier Giarth Pharaon, who already owns 10 per cent of Montedison's shares and is a member of its board of directors.

Rejecting rumours of his imminent withdrawal from the group due to Montedison's critical financial state, Pharaon now seems determined to

contribute to the planned capital increase, together with another foreign group which may also acquire shares — Harry Oppenheimer's Anglo American.

Most of the new money will be obtained through the issue of nine new shares (nominal value Italian lire 175 or 17 US cents) for every five already owned. The four Italian companies entering Montedison are going to buy the group's financial firm Gemina and carry out the operation jointly through this firm. With its 16.6 per cent, Gemina will thus become the group's number one shareholder, immediately followed by Pharaon.

The arrival of private business is expected to help Montedison overcome its present crisis. Having lost enormous amounts of money over the past five years Montedison, now chaired by Mario Schimberni, closed its last financial year with a \$448m deficit. Debts hitting a record figure of \$4.2bn, \$2.2bn of which are short-term, must also be added to the picture.

Montedison, however, has the attractions of extremely diversified and technologically advanced production, as well as hypermodern equipment and strong market shares in Europe and the developing countries. Further hopes of getting the group on its feet again are based on the management's new strategy, which aims at switching manufacturing activities from basic to processed chemicals. So far, 81 per

cent of all Montedison production has been basic chemicals and only 19 per cent processed chemicals. This proportion should now be reversed.

That such a strategy, together with the participation of private Italian and foreign companies, is approved by Italy's business world, is indicated by the steep increase in the value of Montedison's shares which, on the first day after the announcement registered a 5 per cent rise.

The Montedison case appears to be part of a general trend in Italy from public to private. It follows ENI's sale of a number of shares belonging to some of its major affiliates through the stock exchange. This in turn appears to be the prelude to joint ventures by ENI and private companies in its textile sector (much of which will be sold) on the lines of the agreement between ENI and Occidental which resulted in Enoxy, a new company dealing with chemicals and coal.

The gradual dismantling of Italy's public sector, pursued particularly by the socialist members of the government coalition, has been taken a step further by the state steel holding, Finsider's decision to come to an agreement with Nippon Steel, the world's largest after US Steel. According to the terms of this agreement, the Japanese will initially take over the management of Finsider's giant steel plant at Taranto.

(SO: 4 300/17)



# UAE, KUWAIT, LIBYA OFFER LOAN TO FIAT

London 8 DAYS in English 30 May 81 p 34

[Article by Fulvio Grimaldi]

[Text]

FIAT, Italy's car giant, is to benefit from a \$200m loan which joins Libya with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates for the first time financially.

The Arab Banking Corporation (whose director general, Abdullah Saudi, is Libya's representative on Fiat's board of directors), the Kuwait Foreign Trading Corporation (which works in liaison with the Kuwait Investment Office), and Gulf International (on behalf of seven emirates), will contribute \$140m to the \$200m loan. The European banks involved, and charged with the management, are Italy's Banca Commerciale and Britain's National Westminster Bank.

The Arabs' generosity and readiness to come to the aid of a company operating in a sector which is experiencing very difficult times has caused speculation in European financial circles. Experts recall the experience of Chrysler a few months ago. The American corporation, which was desperately looking for funds, was not offered one cent of Arab finance. Fiat, on the other hand, will get its dollars, and on extremely favourable terms. The loan is for seven years, with a four-year grace period and an interest rate only three-quarters of one per cent above Libor.

For this reason experts believe that the loan is phase one and will be followed by

phase two, which may turn out to be the expansion of the Arabs' present 10 per cent stake in Fiat. Fiat sources hint that Kuwait may be particularly interested in such a move. Kuwait has never had so much cash as at present, and aims at diversifying its investments beyond the stake it already holds in US companies, and in buildings and real estate in London, Frankfurt and New York.

The Fiat loan comes at a time when investments in the US seem particularly rewarding, due to the strong dollar and high interest rates. The same goes for Japan, where average earnings from shares last year amounted to around 37 per cent. Arab investment in Fiat, whose shares have been going down and whose prospects appear rather uncertain, does not seem very logical in strictly economic terms. For this reason the motives behind the decision are being seen as mainly political.

Henry Kissinger, former US secretary of state, made it very clear at a conference of Italian industrialists, which was also attended by Fiat chief Gianni Agnelli, that Washington views such growing links with suspicion and displeasure. The Arabs' initiative in favour of Italy's leading industrial group may therefore be seen as a forceful encouragement to resist these American pressures.

## PURPOSE, PROGRAM OF ISLAMIC CALL SOCIETY EXPLAINED

Meunil Phoenix LA VOIX DE L'ISLAM in French Feb/Mar 81 pp 1-4

[Text] Founded on 15 Dhawal 1390 (10 December 1970) by the Constitutional Conference, the Islamic Call Society has settled down to the task before it. It can claim to be one of the greatest achievements of the Glorious Revolution of El Fatah. Governed by a specially designed statute, the work of the Society has taken on a human dimension on a world scale. Its activities cover a quite broad scale of domains at different levels.

Thus it has made exceptional progress towards its goal and hope of bringing peoples as close together as possible in a brotherly relationship for the benefit of all.

The Society's socio-cultural and socio-religious activities concern three major fields: financial assistance; publication and distribution of books and pamphlets; and teaching and missionary work.

1. Distribution of financial aid.
2. Publishing and distributing book, brochures.
3. Teaching and missions.

1. In terms of financial aid, the Society has participated in the execution of several important projects by providing all or part of the cost for several socio-cultural and religious centers, university cities, schools, and mosques. Examples are the Islamic Center in Uganda, the Islamic Center in South Korea, a mosque in Reunion, and the Arabic Academy in Sri Lanka.

Other mosques throughout the world have been restored, renovated, or built with gifts from the Islamic Call Society.

Humanitarian activities of the Society are witnessed by the construction of several hospitals in which the disadvantaged thus benefit from its contribution.

2. Publications and distribution. The Society's educational and instructional activities focus mainly on teaching of Arabic at all levels, and on publication of translations of the Koran, including one in Indonesian, in addition to pamphlets and books on the fundamental principles of Islam, as well as publications for youths and adults in all languages including Chinese and German, an Islamic encyclopedia, and educational scientific texts for youths in several languages.

2. Teaching and missionary work. The Islamic Call Society has assigned missionaries and teachers with university training and teaching experience. Priority is given to teachers proficient in local languages and dialects.

The Islamic Call Society has been and remains aware of the responsibilities incumbent upon it to conduct a determined anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggle, and to fight relentlessly against socio-cultural colonialism, so as to free their coreligionists and the peoples of Africa and Asia from the traditional colonialism and the neo-colonialism in which they are entrapped, thereby refuting the propaganda, prejudices, and allegations indulged in by opponents of Islam and enemies of mankind.

It has therefore pressed on towards fulfillment of its goals and aspirations. Intensive activities went forward without delay at all levels, while the number of schools and cultural-religious centers multiplied throughout the world. The Society also has audiovisual programs and courses.

The Society makes every effort to participate in the building of the nation and its development at all levels. Its activities are essentially creative:

1. Creation of a university-level teachers' college administered by the Islamic Call Society. Founded in 1974, its major objectives are training of instructors and professors, and strengthening of cultural-scientific ties among different universities and peoples.

2. Teaching of the Arabic language to foreigners remains one of the Society's urgent objectives. Courses for non-Arabs began in 1973, and the number of students is growing. Lasting three months, the courses are given periodically, and diplomas are awarded to students who successfully complete each stage.

3. The Moslem Women's Commission. This was formed in 1972 with the goal of emancipating women so that they may play their role at the national level in accordance with their responsibilities in the new Jamahrian era and the Glorious Revolution of Al Fatah, through the drawing together of Arab Moslem women at the national level, and in concert with various women's organizations at the international level.

Major activities of the Commission are the teaching of Arabic, religious education, and organization of meetings, conferences, and symposiums.

The Commission likewise continues to give particular attention to various welfare organizations, and to homes for the elderly.

Courses conducted in foreign languages are given as part of religious education programs for foreign women. Libyan women also benefit from courses in child care and housekeeping given by the Commission.

4. The Islamic Call Society has contributed to the building of hundreds of mosques and local centers of the Popular Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

5. Distribution of funds collected from the Zakat to those entitled thereto.

6. The Society organizes annually and periodically national and international conferences, which have been attended by Mauritians.

7. Organization of contests in recitation of the Koran with participation by all nationals of Islamic countries or countries with Moslem minorities.

The different commissions of the Islamic Call Society make every effort to meet all requests for assistance received from all corners of the world. Its donations are growing, and its charitable works know no frontiers.

An organization of such importance cannot but continue with success along its path, having at its head a person of such caliber as Dr. A. Al Charif, whose reputation extends beyond the frontiers of Libya. Dr. Ahmed Al Charif is a sympathetic and rewarding person by reason of his very broad intellectual endowments embracing the fields of philosophy, education, and the humanities.

Dr. A. Al Charif has participated, as the representative of Libya, in international conferences. Such is the eminent Libyan personality which Mauritius will have the honor and pleasure to receive on Sunday 5 April 1981, and to reserve a warm welcome for him.

Mauritius has benefited from more than one instance of assistance from the Islamic Call Society in the social and educational domains, including the Madad Al Islam Society, and various mosques.

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## AFGHANISTAN

### DEVELOPMENTS IN MUJAHEDIN, SOVIET FIGHTING REPORTED

#### Mujahedin Alliance

Karachi DAWN in English 6 Jun 81 p 4

[Article by Nehdi Abbas Zaida]

[Text] Peshawar, May 31: Three hundred Ulema and religious leaders from all over Afghanistan have finally agreed in principle to forge a grand alliance of all the groups of Afghan Mujahideen, so as to launch a successful final assault against Russian forces in Afghanistan.

A convention of these Ulema held on May 25 has released the agreement in principle signed by all the participants, including the existing six major groups of Mujahideen led by Prof Burhanuddin Rabbani, Maulana Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, Engineer Gulbaden Hikmatyar, Mr Sibghatullah Mujaddadi, Maulvi Mohammad Yunus Khalis and Faiz Ahmad Gilani.

The alliance will have a common flag, common stamp and a common leader.

#### Raid on Kabul Radio Station

Karachi DAWN in English 31 May 81 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, May 30: Soviet security forces foiled an attempt by Afghan insurgents to seize Kabul Radio last Sunday, according to reliable reports from the Afghan capital received here yesterday.

Two of the guerrillas who managed to enter the radio building were killed by Soviet soldiers guarding the installation, witnesses were reported as saying.

One Soviet soldier was said to have been wounded in the shooting.

Fighting has broken out in Paghman about 20 kms from Kabul between the insurgents and combined Soviet and Afghan government troops, according to the same reports.

On Saturday, insurgents attacked the Governor's house in Paghman, the old royal summer capital. It was reported that an unspecified number of Soviet troops were killed and many buildings were set afire during the raid.

The Soviet military command mounted a counter-attack the following day but failed to retake the area from the guerrillas who apparently enjoy local support, according to the reports.

Soviet MIG's and helicopter gunships were seen flying toward Paghman from Kabul International Airport.

Thirteen Afghan army personnel, including a political chief of the Fourth Armoured Division, were killed in a pitched battle in Ghazni, south of Kabul, the PRESS TRUST OF INDIA (PTI) reported today.

The news agency, quoting travellers from Afghanistan, said the battle took place last week after the Afghan army launched an offensive against guerrillas entrenched in Ghazni, PTI said the soldiers were buried in Kabul on May 27 and traffic on the funeral procession route was stopped. No other details of the battle were available. [as published]

A Soviet force backed by tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery and air bombardment has launched a new attack against Afghan guerrillas holding the provincial capital of Ghazni, a delayed report reaching here from Afghanistan said.

About 50 Soviet soldiers were killed and more than 20 tanks and a number of other vehicles were destroyed in the fighting, according to the report from a Kabul source who has been accurate in the past.

It said the city of about 48,000 population, located some 130 kilometers southwest of Kabul, was under assault in what was described as the first large-scale Soviet offensive in the province in months. A large number of houses were reported damaged by the shelling.

#### Assault on Women Repulsed

Lahore PAKISTAN TIMES in English 28 May 81 p 1

[Text] LONDON, May 24: The incidence of assaulting the Afghan women at the hands of Soviet officers and soldiers have registered an alarming increase during the Soviets' year-long stay in Afghanistan.

Details of an incident that took place in Kandahar cantonment a few days back, have come to the light. It had been reported that a bloody encounter took place between the Soviet and Afghan forces as a result of an incident of dishonouring the Afghan women by Soviets. According to the latest information, 360 Soviet soldiers and officers and 100 Afghan soldiers had been eliminated in the clash.

The Afghan soldiers had attacked Soviet officers on the night of May 8 when they had heard the shrieks of Afghan women from their rooms.

The National Liberation Front, Peshawar sources, said that the fighting had continued till the dawn next day.

According to another report received from Kandahar that the Soviet forces killed more than 100 members of 20 Khalqi and Parchami families who had taken shelter in the Higher Secondary School Kandahar.

An eye witness reaching Pakistan reported that the School was vacant due to students' boycott of classes. The Khalqi and Parchami families moving to Kandahar from rural areas in fear of Mujahideen had taken

refuge in the school.

On May 12, a Soviet officer with some soldiers headed towards the school. They halted in front of the school gate and commanded the residents to supply them some girls. It was reportedly the custom of the families residing there previously. The helpless people pelted Soviets with stones who fled away.

The Soviets informed the cantonment that these were in fact Mujahideen in the guise of Khalqis and Parchamis. An operation was launched against them instantly. Guns were installed outside the school and over 100 persons were killed. Only 70 members of the families could survive the attack.—AAP.



## Army Commander Killed

Lahore PAKISTAN TIMES in English 28 May 81 p 1

[Text]

MAY 27: The commander of the 8th Division of Afghan Army, who was seriously wounded during Mujahideen's operation expired in Wazir Akbar Khan Hospital in Kabul last week.

The Jamiat-e-Islami, Afghanistan, in a Press release issued in Peshawar today, claimed that the commander, Pira Masbar, was on his way to Farwan Province dur-

ing the movement of the 8th Division which had been camped in Qarghai near Kabul when the Mujahideen launched an attack on its column in Ghorband. The commander, who received serious bullet injuries, was rushed to Kabul for medical treatment but he succumbed to his injuries in the hospital. He was buried in Kabul.

## Strained Relations of Armies

Lahore PAKISTAN TIMES in English 26 May 81 pp 1, 5

[Text] London, May 25: The 12th division of Afghan army and the Soviet forces stationed in Jalalabad have strained relations these days. In spite of Karmal's personal intervention the tension among the forces has not subsided, says AAP Press release.

AAP has reported from Jalalabad that the Afghan forces had refused to take part in the operations in the areas of Sarkharood, Chaparhar and the southern and south-western parts of Sherzad. These areas had been in Mujahideen's control since beginning of the winter.

The Soviets had planned to bomb the areas and send a large number of tanks to start a major operation. The Afghan army officers raised the objection that Mujahideen did not have the control of big towns for long. Hence, there was no use to kill thousands of people and indulge in the bloody operations.

In view of the tense situation prevailing between the two forces, Babrak Karmal had recently undertaken a visit to Jalalabad. However, the Afghan officers continue to stick to their stand.

Meanwhile, the Government hospitals in Kabul have refused to receive further wounded and dead Soviet soldiers.

In the city's five big hospitals including Shafa Khana Qawa-i-Markaz No 1, 2 and 3, Shafa Khana Wazir Akbar Khan and Chahar Sad Bistar Shafa Khana, the rooms and verandas are jam-packed with wounded.

The agency sources have reported from the Afghan capital that the administration was informed on May 17, from Chahar Sad Bistar Shafa Khana that there was no space for a single dead body in the hospital mortuary. From this hospital alone, as many as 1,500 coffins were despatched to the Soviet Union. These dead bodies were brought from Kabul and Paghman. It seemed that often the dead bodies were brought so hurriedly that the blood was seen dripping down the vehicles on the roads of Wazir Akbar Khan area.

REUTERS adds: Afghanistan and the Soviet Union yesterday agreed to set up consulates in their countries, Kabul Radio reported.

The Radio, monitored in New Delhi, quoted Afghan Foreign Minister Shah Mohammad Dost as saying: 'The establishment of consular relations would bring together still closer the people of the two countries.'

#### Secret Jails

Karachi DAWN in English 6 Jun 81 p 7

[Text] London, June 5: Secret and unauthorised jails have been operating in Kabul and other cities of Afghanistan for extracting confessions from the people says a Press release issued by AGENCY AFGHAN PRESS.

The disclosure was made by a young man, Talib, who recently escaped from the secret jail in the basement of Pamir Cinema, lying on the Jada-i-Mywand in Kabul.

He said that persons like Secretary, Housing and Physical Planning and a known surgeon of a Kabul hospital were also rotting in the Pamir Cinema Jail unaware of their fate. Both of them belonged to Khalq party. APP.

CSO: 4600



BBC REPORT ON AIR BASE ATTACKS

TA171557 London BBC World Service in English 1500 GMT 17 Jun 81

[From radio newsreel]

[Text] In the continuing armed opposition by Afghan rebels to the presence of Soviet forces in their country, reports say a Soviet air base near Kabul has been attacked and set on fire. As Mark Tully reports from Delhi, the attack came on a significant rebel anniversary:

[Begin recording] The Baghlam Air Base, 40 miles north of Kabul, is second only in importance to the capital's airport. Diplomatic reports say that rebels poured petrol into drainage ditches and then lit it. Large amounts of ammunition and (?fuel) exploded in the resultant fire. One source says that explosion continued into the next day and shrapnel fell several kilometers away. Soviet Mig jet fighters and helicopters at the base are said to have taken off shortly after the first explosion was heard. The main road from Kabul to the Soviet border which (?cut) the air base was closed on the following day and again 4 days later.

The attack coincided with the first anniversary of the capture and death of one of the most charismatic of the rebel leaders, Abdul Majid Kalakani. He came from Parwan near the air base. Several other incidents are reported to have taken place in Parwan Province, coinciding with that anniversary, including the shelling of the provincial governor's house. Diplomats quote one source from Charikak, some 45 miles from Kabul on the road to the Soviet border, as saying 14 trucks of the Soviet-Afghan Transport Company were burned by rebels on the night of the anniversary. Another report says that 11 trucks were burned only 20 miles from the strategic (Salang) tunnel on the same road. Some 200 Afghan troops are said to have deserted in the town of Jabal Saraj on that road and heavy fighting was reported there on Friday and Saturday last week.

Within 10 miles of Kabul itself, there has been more fighting in the former summer capital of the Afghan Roly family. About 300 rebels are also reported to have attacked Afghan troops guarding a dam on the edge of the capital. Diplomats quote Afghan media as indicating that the authorities are still facing great difficulties in Qandahar, the country's second largest city. The government paper reported that party workers had helped to move grain from the city to the airport which is heavily guarded. Kabul Television said that religious leaders of Qandahar had met the governor to discuss the deteriorating living conditions and continuing rebel attacks. [end recording]

## BRIEFS

KABUL EARTHQUAKE--Kabul, 21 Jun (BAKHTAR)--Three earthquake tremors shook Kabul city last night, the seismological centre at Kabul University reported. Of these three, one was of relatively greater intensity and was registered 5 degrees on the Mercalli Scale. [Text] [LD220648 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0440 GMT 22 Jun 81]

SOVIETS HELD PRISONERS--Islamabad, 17 Jun (UNI-DPA)--Afghan "mujahideen" (guerrillas) are at present holding about 2,000 Soviet prisoners, according to a spokesman of the Pakistan-based Afghan resistance group, Jamiat-e-Islami. (Qazi Nek Mohammad), the spokesman, said here on Wednesday that the prisoners were being held in underground cells and "as far as possible" were kept alive. "Only when the mujahideen fear that the enemy will overwhelm them do they execute their prisoners," he said indicating that it was the new rule. Previously the mujahideen were known to kill the captured Russians, sometimes by torture and with or without a summary trial. The mujahideen captured six more Russians last Sunday, the spokesman said reporting an encounter near Gomal in Paktia Province bordering Pakistan. [Text] [BK230555 Delhi INDIAN EXPRESS in English 18 Jun 81 p 1]

REPLENISHING ARMED FORCES--New Delhi, 19 June--the pro-Moscow regime of Babrak Karmal has launched a new conscription drive to replenish the ranks of its desertion-plagued armed forces following increased resistance by guerrillas, a Kabul report said on Monday. An estimated 10,000 Kabul high school students in the final year have been directed to enroll for compulsory military service, the source said. All those who enroll will be eligible for graduation certificates without taking examinations, he added. The source, who has been accurate in the past, said a steady series of desertions and civil war casualties have reduced the strength of the Afghan army to 25,000 from 90,000 at the time of the December 1979 Soviet military intervention. This forced the regime recently to lower the minimum draft age from 22 to 19, the source reported. But boys as young as 15 were being forcibly taken to military induction camps by search parties making nightly sweeps of Kabul residential neighborhoods, the sources said, adding that a large number of young men have fled to escape the draft. Authorities in Kabul have also increased the term of service of all categories of soldiers by 1 year, the report added.--APA. [Text] [GF221343 Karachi DAWN in English 20 Jun 81 p 1]

NEW BULGARIAN PREMIER--Kabul, 21 June (BAKHITAR)--A congratulatory telegram has been sent by Sultan 'Ali Keshtmand, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, to Sofia, addressed to Grisha Filipov on his appointment as the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Bulgarian People's Republic. Wishing him good health and further successes in this new post, the telegram expresses confidence that the fraternal relations and internationalist cooperation between the peoples and governments of Bulgaria and Afghanistan will further expand for the benefit of the peoples of the two countries and the consolidation of world peace. [Text] [LD220906 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0445 GMT 22 Jun 81]

CSO: 4600/21

## SOCIAL DISCONTENT REPORTED TO BE INCREASING

Paris LE MONDE in French 1 Jun 81 p 3

{Article from correspondent Daniel Junqua: "Social Unrest Keeps Increasing"}

(Text) In its Thursday 28 May issue, REVOLUTION AFRICAINE, the organ of the FLN has published a severe warning to the "men who work in the shadows, both inside and outside the country" in order to "destabilize" the power. The fact is that, as our correspondent reports, activists' doings (LE MONDE, 21, 22 and 24-25 May) reflect a social unrest which extend beyond the universities. In addition, the disciplinary board of the Annaba university has pronounced the final exclusion of 19 students accused of taking part in "acts of vandalism."

Algiers--The activities of Muslim activists are only the most serious element in a situation which causes much concern. There exist an undeniable social unrest, an increasingly widespread feeling of being somehow "fed up." The steady rise in prices, the dramatic housing shortage, the inadequacy of public facilities, the increase in social differences, the luxury which is too openly displayed by some, are steadily becoming harder to bear for a population which includes 60 percent of youths under 20, many of whom are unemployed. All this has provided the Muslim activists with ready themes for their propaganda.

In addition, this social unrests leads to violent and sudden explosions, like those that occurred lately at Bordj-Menaïel near Algiers, after a soccer game, or near Lakhdaria, where a whole community rose in protest against the transfer of their city hall which had been decided without their being asked.

Public opinion has welcomed the cleaning-up campaign launched by President Chadli Bendjedid, and the head of the state retains a large capital of sympathy and confidence. But an increasing number are blaming him for hesitating and putting off action, and wonder whether he will be able to "go all the way." The first trials of personalities accused of corruption, misappropriation of state funds, and various embezzlements are scheduled to start early in June. On the other hand, a few ill-advised operations have further contributed to creating a heavy atmosphere, especially the purchase of a few thousand Japanese Honda cars, which look luxurious and have been said somewhat too often to be reserved for the cadres. It did not take long for the people to react, and dozens of these cars have been vandalized (broken windshields and headlights, scratched paint finish, etc.), or even entirely destroyed, as in Oran.

## ALGERIA

### CHELIFF NEW NAME FOR ASNAM

Paris LE MONDE in French 28 May 81 p 7

[Article from interim correspondent: "El-Asnam Comes to Life Again Under the Name of Cheliff"]

[Text] El Asnam--On Wednesday 27 May in Paris, the UNESCO general director, Mr Amdou Mahtar M'Bow made an appeal to international solidarity to help in the reconstruction of the educational, scientific and cultural buildings which were destroyed last 10 October in the El Asnam earthquake; the day before, President Chadli Bendjedid had visited the area and inaugurated several housing developments intended for the victims of the disaster. To symbolize the return to normal conditions, he announced the end of the military command mission and the direct resumption, by civilian authorities, of all their responsibilities.

El Asnam--formerly Orleansville, which had already been destroyed by an earthquake in 1954--will now be called Cheliff, from the name of a local river.

### Damages Exceed 20 Billion Francs

Seven months after the disaster which killed almost 3,000 people, according to official figures, all of the people's hopes are turned toward improving daily living conditions. After an extremely cold winter spent under tents (LE MONDE, 23 April), the major concern is housing. Twenty-three thousand small prefabricated houses have been imported from Europe and Canada: they are intended for the cities; another 21,500 will be erected in rural areas by Algerian enterprises or under a build-your-own program with the aid of national service draftees.

The first prefabricated housing units had been promised for the end of March; delivery has been much delayed because of the search for suitable sites, poor weather conditions, road reconditioning and, now, the inability of suppliers to maintain the delivery rates mentioned in the contracts.

According to official sources, 6,200 small houses had already been delivered on 10 May, and 3,200 had been assembled. These housing units are expected to last for some 20 years, until the disaster area has been permanently rebuilt; they include all the usual amenities.

Negotiations are under way to import collective facilities, administrative buildings, health infrastructures and especially some 2,000 classrooms to replace the tents at the start of the next school year.

The Algerian government, which had estimated at over 20 billion francs the damages caused by the earthquake has, for its part, granted another 4 billion francs of credits, in addition to the first 8 billion francs made available in January.

9294

CSO: 4800/79



## IRAN

### SECURITY OF EASTERN BORDER QUESTIONED

Tehran "EYAN-E JABHEH-YE NELLI in Persian 19 May 81 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Warning to the Iranian People! Who is Responsible for Securing the Eastern Borders of the Country?"]

[Text] It is a reality that our brother and neighboring nation, Afghanistan, is suffering from the tyranny of a dictatorial, anti-people, dependent government which has imposed the harshest living conditions on this deprived nation. It is also true that we, as a neighboring country, have certain responsibilities toward this brother nation of fellow believers. We must do our duty based on defined standards and in a calculated and reasonable way, such as creating camps for the Afghan refugees, issuing visas and work permits for them, and, if possible, providing them with food or any other kind of help we can give. But what has happened and what is going on at the present time are quite different.

The number of Afghans who have crossed the borders illegally into Iran and are merely considered as brother Moslems by the ruling body is unknown, as is the case with many other things nowadays. About 2 million Afghans are now living in Iran illegally. And because there are no regulations, unfortunately, certain undesirable individuals have also penetrated this large population.

Even if we do not deal with the theft and crimes committed throughout the country by some of these mischievous individuals among the Moslem brothers; even if we do not say a word about the fact that millions of Iranian workers are unemployed, for reasons which can be explained, and have been replaced in the workshops by these Moslem brothers; even if we do not mention the fact that given the shortages of food and the rationing of the most vital needs of our own people, providing food for these 2 million people is an additional burden; and even if we do not raise the issue of some of these brother Moslems being extensively involved in smuggling arms and narcotics, we cannot remain silent concerning one problem, which is: given the present condition of the country, it is possible that among this large foreign group in Iran, there exists a significant force

organized by the worldwide conspiratorial powers, which can be used for conspiratorial policies, when necessary, against the Iranian people and the territorial integrity of Iran. Hence, we find it necessary to warn not the simple-minded authorities and those for whom a country means nothing, but the true owners of this country, the Iranian people, of the probability of this danger. Let it be said, so that in the future it will not be said that no one paid attention to this important issue. It must also be pointed out that each one of the unpleasant social ills resulting from the presence of these people in the country mentioned earlier are of such importance that a quick solution to this problem is necessary.

3503

CSO: 4640/11



# SIMILARITIES SEEN IN SAVAK'S, PRESENT REGIME'S TACTICS

Tehran PEYAN-E JABHEH-YE MELLI in Persian 19 May 81 pp 1, 4

[Article: "SAVAK Was Hated for the Same Tactics Used at the Present Time"]

[Text] Rulers who are alienated from the people are extremely afraid of the impact, side effects, and consequences of public discontent. Hence, they try to somehow prevent the expression, reflection, and spread of this discontent, which often occurs in the people's discussions. The tactics followed by the previous regime is a case in point. At that time, the mystery that SAVAK had enveloped itself in and was even advertising had caused uncertainty, terror, fear, skepticism, and distrust, in addition to the forced precepts and standards of this terrible organization, to prevail over the society. It had forced the people to be careful and cautious in their interactions with one another. This caution doubled with pessimism existed everywhere and for almost everyone, on the street, in the office, and even among family members. You were afraid lest some family member be a SAVAK informer without your knowing it; you would not speak critically in a taxi lest the driver or one of the passengers be a secret agent; and you would not express skepticism in the office about the notorious "great civilization" or express any complaints whatsoever lest some fellow employee be a SAVAK agent who might inform on you and take your job away! True, if you complained, protested, or expressed opposing views, if your actions, behavior, or words spoke of your internal pain, or if in carrying out your "duty" you "failed" the test, you would not only be deprived promotions and various benefits but you would also be punished so severely by the peculiar tactics and obstacles that they created for you that you would never even think of doing the same again. Occupying high positions in the administration or other organizations of the country --with few exceptions--often depended on submissiveness, contentment, and long experience in flattery and the customary good behavior and obedience of the time. All of these worked as control levers and means of creating an oppressive environment through which the Satanic SAVAK organization was able to make its will prevail over the society.

And the present dictators are moving very rapidly in the same direction. On top of creating organizations for the censorship of ideas and autocratic, jack-of-all-trade political and ideological institutions called "Islamic societies" within government organizations and offices and in the military; on top of the arrests and imprisonments by the committees, torture, and harassment of people, the notorious trials of the revolutionary courts, executions in the streets in order to create terror and fear in the people, stoning, chopping off hands and feet of human beings, absolute control over radio and television, and closing, banning, and censorship of the press, the autocratic rulers took another step last week:

The war-time Court for Violations and Fines has warned all drivers of public vehicles, especially taxi drivers, that "for counterrevolutionary behavior such as spreading rumors, insulting the authorities of the country, and weakening the regime of the Islamic Republic, in addition to being heavily fined, they will have their work permits voided and their names taken off the list of the responsible drivers of Tehran." (!)

You can see that the ruling dictators who are aware of the deep discontent of the people have found the way to prevent its expression! Through such "measures," none of these "martyr-nurturing people" would dare speak about unemployment, poverty, high prices, confusion, closure of the universities, "rumors," torture, corruption, theft, the injustice and cruelty of the regime, or many other problems and calamities which the people face, nor would they even speak about their personal situations with the person next to them because such conversation might be considered spreading rumors, insulting the authorities of the country, or weakening the regime of the Islamic Republic, and the speakers would be regarded as counterrevolutionaries!

These gentlemen have forgotten that firstly, SAVAK was hated for exactly such tactics. Secondly, given the anarchy prevailing over the society, have the operators of the "system of the Islamic Republic" left any system at all, that we can speak of "weakening" it? Who else is to blame?

0537

0537: 46-06/11

# RESTORATION OF MONARCHY TERMED UNAVOIDABLE

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 1 Jun 81 pp 1,2

[Article: "Things which are not said in the West"]

[Text] Saturday 23 May, one of the judiciary spokesmen for the Islamic republic spoke on the radio; in a toneless voice, he announced "the discovery and neutralization of a new plot to overthrow the regime."

According to the speaker, the underground monarchist group "Pars," which intended to overthrow the Islamic republic, was the third card played by the Americans. The first two had been the disastrous Tabas expedition (25 April 1980) and the Iraqi aggression. These monarchists were said to have maintained permanent contacts with Shah Reza II, Queen Farah, and with Bakhtiar, Oveissi, Madani and Nazih, all of whom were said to have provided instructions and financing. According to the spokesman, the 300 suspected of complicity with the conspirators included some bazaris and a few clerics. Eighteen were arrested.

Two days later, we learned that some 70 more people had been arrested; among them were army and police officers, pasdarans, bazaris and clerics.

The most striking fact in the version given by the Islamic republic is that it is illogical. The mixture of complicity it denounces is, to say the least, surprising. All observers know that Admiral Madani and former President of the Bar Nazih, who were among the first supporters of Khomeyni and later on became his opponents, have openly declared themselves in favor of the creation of an Iranian republic, and that they are not in contact with the monarchists. In addition, Bakhtiar, who remains the irreconcilable enemy of Oveissi, himself a royalist, has never clearly taken position or stated his intentions.

It is also known that the Islamic government feels threatened primarily by the dissident clergy and by the bazaris, not to mention the monarchists whom they consider, of course, to be the most dangerous; these are the people they try to eliminate at all costs. The dissident clergy still retain a wide audience and the bazaris are still very rich and influent. Contrary to what one might believe, the regime is not much afraid of leftist groups; they retain the rights to sell their newspapers in the street, while one line, one photograph from a monarchist source is the occasion for terrible punishment, which may mean immediate execution.

This new demonstration of the strength and scope of the monarchist movement obviously throws the authorities into a panic; they take advantage of it, however, and their ultimate action is to commit new crimes. There is no need to stress the lack of credibility of their version of the "plot." One fact remains: no one, or almost no one, now doubts but that the restoration of the monarchy is unavoidable. Monarchy is profoundly anchored in the soul and collective subconscious of the Iranians; after 2500 years it is still the only regime most of the people know how to live with and under which they think they can find a solution to their problems.

It would have been childish to believe that two years of hideous crimes and oppression could change this state of mind. It would have been childish to think that the old order could be suppressed by cowardly shooting its best proponents. It was vain to imagine that the Iranians would chose archaic obscurantism and barbarity. Besides, the people have shown a pride and moderation which would be hard to find elsewhere in periods of such anarchy. Nobody has taken advantage of the chaos to sack defenseless cities.

The mudjaheddin (Islamist Marxists) themselves have yielded to evidence; they have noticed that monarchist feelings were still alive in the hearts of the majority of our compatriots and are attempting to ally themselves with them to overthrow the "mollarchy." In an open letter addressed to Khomeyni and published in the daily KEYHAN (12 May), they complain about the public insults which they are suffering and admit that "... even under the old regime it was never like that... Let us only recall that during the past two years only, 50 of our militants have been killed, 14 of them in the last 40 days alone. In the 9 May issue of KEYHAN, we find the following statement of the mudjaheddin spokesman: "We feel that the political future belongs to the nationalist bourgeoisie and that a tactical alliance with it is necessary..." Whether the mudjaheddin intend to use the "bourgeoisie" as a stepping stone in the future is another question. What is important is that the strength of the feelings of loyalty to the monarchy has finally been recognized. This is what has thrown the Islamic republic into a panic; in view of the scope and intensity of the movement, they can no longer ignore it or remain silent. This is why the constant warnings of Khomeyni to his faithfuls alternate with spectacular revelations intended to frighten the people or draw their attention away from the real problem.

Alone, the western mass-media remain obstinately silent, they will wait and see. The mollahs know perfectly well that they lack the national and historical legitimacy enjoyed by the monarchy. They know that this silent, steady and obstinate upsurge will not be stopped by terror and murder but that, on the contrary, it will go on increasing every day.

And yet, yet... In spite of these remarkable events which, unfortunately, promise to bring more bloodshed, Eric Rouleau, usually so prolific about the sad exploits of the Islamic Republic, remains eloquently silent: this time the heroes of the day are no friends of his.

TUDEH PARTY'S DEFENSE AGAINST PREMIER RAJA'I'S ATTACKS

Tehran NAMEH-YE MARDOM in Persian 26 May 81 pp 1, 2

[Text] Mr Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i, the prime minister, said in a speech in a seminar on the problems of workers recently held in the auditorium of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs:

"The main opponents of the revolution in the working environment are highly political organizations, including the Tudeh Party. To purge the environment, special attention must be paid to this group. . . . What concerns us is that there are groups which are cunning and, unfortunately, although they pretend to follow the line of the imam, they neither believe in the imam's God nor his downtrodden. They are the staunch enemies of Islam. In my opinion, these people receive direct instructions from abroad. Whenever they are instructed to compromise, they wait patiently in the face of your greatest attacks; and if they are ordered to attack, they chop off the heads of the most oppressed people of the society. They have already shown themselves in two distinct periods. During the period of Dr Mosaddeq's movement, they did not give a moment's chance to this man to continue his fight against England . . . ."

(NIZAN, 30-2-60 [20 May 81])

We usually refrain from responding to insults against the Tudeh Party of Iran [TPI]. But when the speaker is the prime minister, we have no choice but to analyse and answer the issue.

The summary of Mr Raja'i's attack against the TPI is as follows:

First, one of the "main opponents of the revolution" is the TPI. Second, in "purging the environment," "special attention must be



said" to the Tudeh members. Third, the TPI not only does not believe in the "imam's God" but does not even believe in the "down-trodden people of the imam." Fourth, this party "receives direct instructions from abroad" and if it is instructed to attack, "it will even chop off the head of the most oppressed people of the society."

And the "reason" behind all this slander and insult is that the TPI "did not give Mosaddeq the chance to fight against England . . ."

We are extremely surprised and disappointed that the prime minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran should make statements which neither benefit the revolution, nor are truthful, nor are in accordance with common standards of social behavior because:

1. The "main enemy of the revolution" is imperialism headed by the United States and not the TPI, whose sacrificing defense of the revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran is known to everyone in Iran and throughout the five continents.

What makes a responsible and committed authority cloud the line between friends and enemies, placing among the "main opponents" a sincere, self-sacrificing friend such as the TPI, a group whose best members are offering their lives in the war fronts to defend the revolution?

2. Instructions to "pay special attention" to the Tudeh members in "purging the environment" is first of all unjust and contrary to the interests of the revolution, because you cannot throw out of the front lines of the defenders of the revolution a group of the most sincere, self-sacrificing defenders of the revolution merely because of their worldview of scientific socialism. Furthermore, purging the Tudeh members is a violation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran which prohibits censorship of ideas. Just a few days ago, the head of the Supreme Judicial Council and the prosecutor general said that anyone who supports the revolution cannot be dismissed because of his political beliefs. Then, how can you include in a purge the Tudeh members, who are sincerely giving their lives to defend the revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran?

3. We have declared a thousand times that the TPI is not a religious party; it is a political party; it is a party for the workers. In our party, there are workers and laborers who are Moslems and those who follow other religions.

Concerning the statement that the Tudeh members do not believe in the "down-trodden people of the imam," we must say that the TPI is the new party of the Iranian working class and the party of all working and deprived people of this society. We are the party of the same class that /Imam Khomeyni/ [in boldface] calls "ghetto-dwellers" and

"palace-dwellers," whom he considers higher than any palace-dweller. Our party, with all its being and with its own political views, has unbreakable ties with those who work with their hands and those who work with their minds. Our party has made thousands of sacrifices for these very downtrodden people in its life of 40 years.

How could such a party be called anti-downtrodden?

5. "Getting direct instruction from abroad" is also an old slander which has been repeated for 60 years against the new party of the Iranian working class by the enemies of the Iranian people. It is most surprising and unfortunate that the prime minister of the revolutionary government of Iran speaks against the most struggling and oldest party of our country by using the words, idioms, and weapons made by the lowest imperialistic and tyrannical organizations.

6. Concerning "not giving a chance" to Dr Mosaddeq in "fighting England," in fact, we have explained the fight of the TPI during the movement for the nationalization of oil and its relations with the government of Dr Mosaddeq over and over again, most recently in the book "Tajrobeh-ye Bist-o Hasht-e Mordad" [The Experience of the 28th of Mordad]. History must be read free of prejudice, then judgment can be made. How can such an accusation be made of a party which has carried the banner of struggle against British and American imperialism, a party which was the only political organization supporting Dr Mosaddeq at the outset of the 28 Mordad [6 Aug] coup, a party which lost many of its best members, who were also the best children of this nation, to firing squads, and hundreds of whom were thrown into the dungeons of prisons as a result of the 28 Mordad coup?

7. Under the present conditions in which we are faced with various conspiracies of imperialism headed by the United States, the main enemy of the Iranian people, and the counterrevolution which it has nurtured--when /Imam Khomeyni/ [in boldface] has instructed that an environment of calm be established, that escalation of the differences between the pro-revolutionary forces be avoided, and that all the revolutionary forces, regardless of political, ideological, or religious beliefs, be mobilized and united against the main enemy and against the war which has been forced on our country by the main enemy--who will benefit from Mr Raja'i's slander and insults against one of the main defenders of the revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the TPI?

We are most surprised and disappointed at the statements of Mr Raja'i against the TPI. We strongly protest these untruthful, unjust, and slanderous statements. But despite all of this, we will not deviate from our correct path and we will persistently continue our principle revolutionary line. The total support of the TPI for the revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran does not come from fear,

hypocrisy, or hopes for any special favors. We, the Tudeh members, have been walking forward for decades with our people in front of the revolutionary caravan. We have tolerated insults, slander, exile, imprisonment, torture, and executions along this road. We are also ready to suffer all sorts of hardship in defending the revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran because: /In our belief, one is an infidel if one feels offended!/ [in boldface]

But once again we remind you of the wise statement of /Imam Khomeyni/ [in boldface]: Our people made a revolution with unity and became victorious over the tyrant and the Great Satan. And our people can bring a decisive, final victory to the revolution only through unity.

We hope and expect that Mr Raja'i, as the prime minister who follows the line of the imam, will always keep in mind the wise statement of /Imam Khomeyni/ [in boldface].

9507

TSS: 4640/2



# MUSLIM STUDENTS ATTACK LEGAL BILL ON POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Teheran STUDENT PAMPHLET in Persian 29 Mar 81 pp 1-2

[Text] Warning By the Union of Moslem Students Association of the Universities and Institutions of Higher Learning pertaining to the abolition of Revolutionary political freedoms disguised by the so-called legal bill of the Activities of the Political Parties.

In the name of God and in the name of the heroic people of Iran. A group of representatives affiliated with the ruling monopolistic wing have recently introduced a bill to the Parliament about the activities of the parties and associations whose generalities have been approved by the Parliament. From the text of this bill it seems that the reactionary ruling party, which has not gained any result from the unofficial policy of mace-bearing and terror in the past two years aimed to crush or at least to seclude the revolutionaries, is now trying deceitfully to pass and implement such bills in order to disguise legally their monopolistic intentions and aims so that they can legalize and complete the policy of crushing the people's freedom and increase the pressure and restrictions upon revolutionary forces.

A short review of the reactionary bill of "the activities of the parties and associations" and its application with the Constitution clearly indicates that whenever the group interests of these constitutional lovers contradict or interfere with what they themselves have passed, how encumbered these devotees become! Although the Constitution has on numerous occasions emphasized the political freedom, freedom of parties, associations, publications and press, holdings of meetings and marches, among them Article 26 of the Constitution says:

"Parties, groups, political and professional associations, as well as Islamic Associations, or recognized religious minorities are free, provided they do not violate principles of independence, freedom, and national unity or Islamic principles or the foundation of the Islamic Republic;"

Also, article 9 of the Constitution indicates:

"In the Islamic Republic of Iran, freedom, independence, unity and the territorial integrity of the country are inseparable from one another and no authority shall limit legal freedom, even by enacting laws and

regulations, in the name of preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the country;" and...

Our people bear witness that as a result of ever-increasing domination of events and backward elements over a large segment of organs and institutions of the country, how these minimum freedoms are constantly and ever-increasingly violated and trampled upon by power expansionists and monopolists. We call to the attention of all progressive and popular forces as well as the responsible and informed personalities to this matter that in case of final approval and implementation of such bills, which clearly represent approval and implementation of such bills, which clearly represent the backwardness and monopolistic belief and perspectives of its schemers and participants, only the ruling monopolistic party and its affiliated societies and groups will be permitted to be active and free from interference of "outsiders" so that they can completely bring the country under their monopolistic domination.

It is essential to be reminded that from our point of view, a genuinely revolutionary and progressive force, especially if it is based on the realistic vision of monotheism, is never scared of confrontation of different thoughts and opinions. On the contrary, it finds them essential to the growth and richness of political culture of the society and welcomes it.

The healthy and revolutionary encounter of genuine Islam with different thoughts and perceptions during its bloody course of history confirms this point. Related to this, we must remember the saying of Father Taleghani who, inspired by the liberating Islamic school of thought, objected to the narrow-minded action of the reactionaries and exclaimed: "Any group which wants to limit the freedom of discussion and criticism has not recognized Islam."

Now we must teach these gentlemen, from whose small brains such reactionary laws have emanated, that the roots of deep social grievances can never be compensated by opposition to democracy or by muzzling the remaining freedom of the people and by shrinking the political atmosphere for the revolutionary forces, organizations and opposition parties, and... for these actions' eliminate the possibilities of a peaceful encounter and campaign among all levels and forces and finally drive the society toward the establishment of a Fascist dictatorship disguised by religion; and this is exactly what the imperialists have anticipated for a long time.

Historical experience of the masses' revolution points out that under present conditions, the safeguard of political freedom can be achieved solely in the framework of a basic campaign against anti-despotism, anti-colonialism and anti-exploitation to solve the social and economic problems of our homeland and liberate the society from the present deadlock. Naturally, only a law, which is based on the interest of the people and helps the depth and expansion of the anti-imperialist struggle in this very sensitive period of our history, can be legitimate and could have the support of the people.

The Union of Moslem Students Association of Universities and Institutions of Higher Learning desires the resistance and wide-reaching protest of our heroic

people, entire forces, and progressive and popular personalities to reveal and eliminate another one of the plots and antihuman plots of the ruling reactionary and monopolists in order that the backward reactionaries forever be frustrated in their hopes of breaking the ties between the revolutionaries and the people.  
[Signed] Union of Moslem Students Association of Universities and Institutions of Higher Learning.

9815

CSO: 4906/232

## HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NATION CITED

London AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in English 22 May 81 pp 8-9

[Text] For twelve years Saddam Hussein and his clique have been in power in Iraq. These years have been a period of constant and rapid decline, culminating in a fratricidal war against the Revolutionary forces of Iran and an ever-increasing spiral of repression at home, and crowned finally by a treacherous alliance with Egypt's Sadat and imperialist America. Here is a report on the political situation in Iraq by an editor of AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR, recently returned from a visit to that country, and extracts from an independent report by Amnesty International, substantiating allegations of torture and terror by Saddam's regime.

THE INFORMATION gathered in Baghdad on the political, economic and social situation is a painful and tragic report on the growing sufferings of the people of Iraq under an incompetent and corrupt regime. At the end of the Tahrir Bridge, on the Karlina side of Baghdad and overlooking the river Tigris, there stands a multi-storied building known as the Ministry of Planning. It also houses the headquarters of the Supreme Planning Council and offices of those honorary Ministers, the so-called Ministers of State. In spite of its name, it provides Iraq with anything but planning.

### Economic disaster

There is chaos and confusion in the so-called Planning Council, chaired by Saddam Hussein

himself. The Ministry is divided into short, medium, and long-term planning sectors, and there are certainly a large number of dedicated and hard-working Ba'athists and non-Ba'athists active there. But all their efforts are regularly frustrated because of the power of veto exercised by Saddam or his cousin Hassan Abdul Majid, the managing director of the Regional Party Secretariat's Head Office, or by any other member of Saddam's clique including Sabah Merza, his right arm, or people like Tabban, Sabaari or Barzan, his brothers.

This was already going on long before the war against Iran, but at present the need to find a million dinars a day for that war has driven these officials into a pitch of frenzy. The country — the second largest oil producer in the world — has still mostly

makeshift school buildings in the rural areas, where millions of people are still suffering from bilharzia, a disease the government could long ago have checked by the proper allocations of resources. So-called official planning has resulted in major food shortages throughout the country, involving even such traditional staple items as watermelons, onions, eggs, etc. Long lines of people queuing up to buy petrol for their cars or bottled gas for their cookers and heaters are a daily scene in Baghdad and throughout the country.

Besides dispatching his regular army to fight against Iran, Saddam has used the armed forces to control the Iraqis and Kurds in the north of the country. For this purpose he chose units of the so-called popular militia

made up of party cadres trained in the use of arms. They include state employees, students, workers, farmers, intellectuals who have been taken out of the economy, producing a further break-down of the system, resulting in understaffed schools and colleges and in a major drop in production in industry and agriculture. This had led, of course, to further economic crisis and shortages, which in turn, has fuelled discontent among the Iraqi people. This in turn, has led Saddam to withdraw even more human and financial resources from the economy to bolster his militias and police forces, charged with repressing the people's discontent. And so the spiral continues and things go from bad to worse.

Political repression is so widespread as to be universal. Saddam's police force terrifies the whole country, repressing anyone courageous enough to express discontent. Courts formed in various parts of the country routinely pronounce the death sentence against critics of the regime's economic policies or of the war against Iran. Dissidents thus executed have included members of the clergy, simple workers and even members of the Ba'athist party itself. Over the months, AL-ZAHF AL-AKHIDAR has printed a number of articles concerning the methods of repression, the torture and the executions that are the daily fare of the Iraqi people.

### The Amnesty report

All our reporting on the subject has been vindicated recently by the publication in London, England, and in other major Western capitals, of a new report prepared by the humanitarian organisation Amnesty International.

The report opens by indicating that for many years, the organisation has regularly received allegations of routine torture of political suspects in the custody of Iraq's security forces. 'In most cases the purpose was said to be to extract confessions for use as evidence in court or to force detainees to renounce their illegal political affiliations and join the ruling Ba'athist party. The interrogation methods of the security forces have been described as brutal, often resulting in permanent physical or mental damage to the victims.'

They also received numerous reports 'of people dying under torture; the bodies of political detainees have been returned to their families with evident signs of torture; badly mutilated bodies have also been dumped in the streets outside the victims' homes; political detainees have "disappeared" while in prison and are reported to have died under torture. Some prisoners have been reported by the authorities to have been sentenced to death and executed for 'political offences' — but unofficial sources say they died under torture before any alleged trial.'

But, says Amnesty, in spite of these repeated allegations and reports, first-hand testimonies have been hard to come by. In October 1979, however, Amnesty International was able to interview at length and to examine medically an Iraqi exile, Burhan Al Shawi, who said he had been severely tortured in 1978 while in the custody of the security forces. The present report also presents testimony by fourteen other Iraqi exiles who said they had been tortured between 1976 and 1979, but they asked for their names and other identifying information to remain confidential for fear of reprisals

against them or their families.

### The story of Burhan Al-Shawi

Here is what Amnesty International's two-day interview and in-depth medical examination of Burhan Al Shawi, a 24-year-old Iraqi journalist and writer, revealed: 'At about 5p.m. on 3 November 1978 he was arrested in a Baghdad street by plain-clothes security officers, who took him to a car parked nearby. He was blindfolded, tied up and kept on the floor of the vehicle during a short ride to the district security headquarters. He was kept blindfolded throughout his detention which lasted nine days.

'Once inside the building he was tied to a chair. In the course of the first two days he was moved from room to room, spending an hour or two in each. He was questioned about his working conditions, what he did in his spare time and his future plans. He was offered something to drink and was also allowed to go to the toilet. In each of the various rooms there were between two and ten people who beat him alternately with the flat of the hand, the fist, a hard stick and a whiplike instrument. His face was beaten several times with rods and fists until his lips swelled and bled. In one room two people said how handsome he was, kissed him several times, caressed him, pawed over and licked his genitals; after an hour of this he was taken to another room where he was beaten and kicked.

'On the third day he was questioned about his political affiliations and asked to disclose the names of those holding similar views. He was promised a good job if he would disclose the names. Most of the time he lay



face down on the floor with his hands tied behind his back. His interrogators trod hard on his body several times. He was beaten on his hands and on the soles of his feet with a stick and a whip, probably made of split electric flex. In another room the same day they tried to induce an erection of his penis both by hand and mouth.

Then the torture became more systematic, taking place every one or two hours. His head was whipped and beaten so hard that he often lost consciousness. In the course of the third or fourth day he lost all sense of time. Once he was tied to a chair, his chest against the seat and his limbs bound against the legs of the chair. He was then punched and beaten with a stick. He fainted several times. After regaining consciousness on one occasion he was aware that he had been raped. He was then made to sit on a cold bottle like object which was forced into his rectum causing violent pain. He fainted and woke up when cold water was poured on him. For weeks after this he bled on defecation.

He also received hard karate-style edge-of-the-hand blows to the lower spine; after this he developed enuresis over a period of days. His interrogation continued over the next few days, often under the supervision of an officer. The interrogators burned him with a sharp object about the size of a pencil. At first he thought it was a cigarette but the hot object was pressed against his skin for too long and he felt it could not be one. They started burning the knuckles of his left hand, threatening, if he still refused to disclose any names, to burn his right hand as well so that he could never write again. His left hand was burned in five

places and then his legs were burned.

All in all, the doctors who examined Al' Shawi in Copenhagen, found 35 circular or oval scars, 'on dorsum of left hand, lateral aspects of thighs, flexor and lateral aspect of both legs, on the medial and lateral aspect of the feet and on the abdominal skin. The size of the scars ranged from 5 millimetres by 5 millimetres to 27 millimetres by 18 millimetres'. The doctors unanimously agreed that all the scars they had observed were 'compatible with lesions from burns'.

During the period when his torturers burned him, the report continues, Burhan Al Shawi 'had no sense of time or place but was aware all the time of the smell of burned flesh and a constant and excruciating pain from the burns that sometimes caused him to lose consciousness. He was offered water and food, but could not eat or drink because of the pain, the smell of burned flesh and his swollen mouth and lips. He was unable to remember everything that happened to him during the nine days or so he spent in the district security headquarters'.

When he awoke after his last spell of unconsciousness he found himself lying in a street close to his home. Passers-by helped him get home. A doctor treated him the first week, but then the doctor had to flee the country hurriedly. He received various medicines, both capsules and tablets. His burns — there were 35 of them — were cleaned with a red fluid. There are several gaps in his memory about this period. At first he slept a lot and could take only fluids. Two months passed before he could move with any ease, and it

was three months before the burns healed. On the night of 6 May 1979 he left Iraq illegally.

Thus ends the narrative of Burhan Al Shawi, journalist, writer, and victim of Saddam's torture squads who spent nine days in the security headquarters in Kharkh, Baghdad. The fourteen other victims of the torture chambers of the butcher of Baghdad, as Saddam has come to be known, had very much the same tales to tell. They included a hospital orderly, a factory worker, journalist, a doctor, university students, a retired lawyer, a clerk and a young man doing his military service. Nine of them were tortured in Baghdad, three in Basra, one in Al Musayyib and Al Hilla and one in Ba quba and Al Khalis.

In Baghdad the majority of the victims were 'interrogated' in the General Directorate of Security, a huge complex of buildings in Saadoun Park, off Al Nidhal Street; or nearby in the security headquarters for the areas of Khark and Rasafa. Others were held in smaller security offices in the districts of Natawiyya, Kafimiya and Qarada Sharqia, possibly located in local police stations. One person said he had been interrogated by the Military Intelligence, at their headquarters in the Ministry of Defence Buildings, Bab Al Mu'athim, Baghdad.

## A catalogue of horrors

Summing up the details of the torture inflicted on all of these Iraqi citizens, Amnesty said that 'all those interviewed had suffered blows on the head, body and extremities from fists, feet or rubber truncheons (some rubber truncheons were described as having a metal rod inside, others as having bands of metal around



them). Some were beaten with rope, a wooden stick or a whip made of split electric flex. Three had been beaten on the genitals. Another man said that pressure had been applied to his eyes through the blindfold. All said they had been blindfolded during all or most of the interrogation, with their hands tied behind their backs.

Twelve people had been subjected to falaqa, and were then forced to walk or run up and down the room on hot salty water. Electrical torture was also used on nearly all the people involved. Three main types were described. 1) A truncheon-like instrument, usually referred to as an 'electric stick', about 30 cm long and with a cable attached to one end, was applied to the sensitive parts of the body, such as the face, breasts and genitals, causing local pains. 2) In a number of cases the current was turned on after a number of separate electrodes had been placed on fingers, nostrils or the abdomen. 3) In one case electrodes were applied to the temples and, as the current was turned on, the victim had convulsions and lost consciousness.

Another traditional torture method employed by Saddam's henchmen was the threat of execution. Prisoners had guns placed against their heads and then the trigger would be pulled. Salvoes of shots would be fired above their heads after they had

been told that they would be executed and asked to say their last prayer. People were also forced to watch other prisoners being tortured for hours on end until they agreed to sign some official declaration. Almost all the people questioned by Amnesty had been humiliated, either by insults or by sexual abuse, or by having their genitals pawed or licked, while two had a bottle inserted into their rectum. The interrogators also threatened to arrest, torture and rape members of the detainees families, including children.

### The butcher of Baghdad

Terrible as these reports are, they were made by people who managed to survive their ordeals and escape from Iraq. But for untold hundreds, their 'interrogations' ended in a slow and painful death, while thousands are still detained in Saddam Hussein's jails and others are being arrested daily. The Iraqi government cynically refutes all this evidence, pretending that nothing of the sort is going on. At the same time it refuses to answer questions concerning the implementation of the UN resolutions concerning the creation of effective mechanisms that would do away with torture.

On 25th January 1971 Iraq ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 7 of which states: No one shall be subjected to tor-

ture or to cruel and inhuman or degrading Treatment or Punishment.' On 9 December 1975, the United Nations' declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, was adopted by consensus by the UN General Assembly. Among other things this declaration states that 'Exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency may not be invoked as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.' On 3 September 1979 the Iraqi Government stated officially that it intended to comply with the declaration and 'to continue the implementation, through its national legislation and other effective measures, of the provisions of the said declarations.'

Iraqi law, in article 22(a) of its constitution, prohibits 'any form of physical or mental torture'. It also states that 'no illegal methods may be used to extract confessions from the accused, including ill-treatment, threats to cause harm, enticement, psychological methods or the use of drugs and spirits'. Saddam Hussein has consistently defied the constitution of his country: he is a liar, a torturer and an outlaw. The people of Iraq will know what to do with him and his clique.

## BAGHDAD UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION PROJECT EXAMINED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 17 May 81 p 2

(Article by Akram Dahannon)

(Text)

To know more about this project we held an interview with Mr. Jassim Muhammad al-Saadi, the General Secretary of the General Board of the Project who said:

The express transport board was formed by virtue of an order of the Revolution Command Council on 2 January, 1980, and was attached to the office of the First Deputy Premier. It was given enough power to carry out detailed designs for the express transport project for the city of Baghdad (Baghdad underground) through a re-examination of the preliminary studies already made and in the light of any innovations in architectural and cultural developments in the city. The board updated and modified the former studies in collaboration with

specialist consultants, and laid down the main outlines and the general specifications as well as the time tables for implementing this project. The Board has screened all the international consulting companies specialised in such works and is now engaged on the detailed designs for the project. The consulting works will be awarded within a short period of time.

On the systems and areas through which the project passes, Mr. al-Saadi said:

The project consists of three systems. First, the express transport system comprising a network of undergrounded trains to ply within the boundaries of the capital. Second, the regional express transport system. This will comprise networks of fast trains connecting the

outlying suburbs of the capital with the city centre. The third system will comprise a network of buslines which will feed the first two systems.

The areas through which it passes: The underground will consist of three main lines. The first line will start from the al-Thawra town terminal, cross through its high street, run along the Army Canal to Beirut square, then to Tayaran Square and on to the main underground station situated in Khallani square, continuing from there under the Caliphs Street to the North Gate square and then turn to run under the Imam al-Aadham street toward Aadhamiya to Antar square and its extension. It will pass under the Tigris river to Khadimiyah heading to the towns of Hurriyah and Shu'la. There will be

about 21 passenger stations for this line, all underground.

The second line will start from Uqbah Ibn Nafi square pass under Sa'doun street, on to the South Gate square and then onward to meet with the first line at Khallani square. From here it will head to Ghariri square in Rashid street and then pass under the Tigris river to Shawaka in the direction of the international railway station, and will continue under Damascus street on to Arab Cavalier square then on under Mansour street up to the railway station at Washash. This line will have 17 underground stations in addition to its extensions from Uqbah Ibn Nafi's square to new Baghdad and Za'faraniya and then run to the Police township and to al-Ameriya as well.

The third line will connect Fahhamah, Waziriya, al-Aamil, al-Bayaa', al-Sayidiyah and Dora with the city centre.

These networks of underground railways will be connected to the regional transport networks by joint stations.

Regarding soil suitability Mr. al-Saadi explained: there are queries on the suitability of the soil within the

capital. Soil layers in Baghdad consist generally of the surface top layer followed by a sand-mud layer which rests on a sand layer. All three layers are permeated by subterranean waters which in some areas reach a depth of one to two metres below ground. This composition of soil strata is not strange to underground construction work, including such structures as railway tunnels. There are many areas in the world which are similar in their soil composition but which have permitted the construction of heavy structures and numerous tunnels. Although this composition is considered a difficult one, it is, however, possible to use the same means employed in many other countries to construct tunnels. Among such means are tunnel drilling machinery specially adapted for boggy soil. There are also means of freezing the soil and of strengthening it by injection of chemicals and other materials. It is also possible to line the tunnels built below the level of underground water with waterproof materials. Some might ask how are the tunnels under the Tigris are going to be built. We reply that this

will be done by studying the best methods employed in such cases. Among these is the construction of the tunnel in sections overground and sinking them to the site intended. There is also the method of drilling the tunnels outside the crossing areas. There are, also other methods, available.

The project's phases: Mr. al-Saadi said: the final studies had proposed the construction of three lines for the underground trains in the form of underground tunnels interconnected with passenger stations under short and long term plans. This project will be constructed within stated time phases. Lines one and two will be completed and put into operation by the end of 1986. Other parts will be completed in successive states. Work on the extensions to these two lines and on parts of line three will commence before 1990. Parts which will be completed will be put into operation. The target is to have the entire underground railway networks in operation by the year 2000.

Project features: The latest technological methods will be employed in designing these un-

derground railways. Passenger comfort will be a main feature of attraction. The trains will run at speeds that will guarantee the arrival of passengers to and from their work areas in good time. Safety will be the first consideration of course. The trains will be able to transport 48000 passengers per hour in every direction. In the rush hours the trains will arrive and depart at intervals of 90-120 seconds. At normal times these intervals will increase to between 10-25 minutes. All trains will be air conditioned and temperatures at stations will be modified too.

Shops and commercial centres of various sizes will be built in all the underground stations. The Arab and Islamic

type of architecture in developed and innovated designs will be employed in all underground structures.

The authorities implementing the project: The project will be divided up into several contracts which will be awarded to individual international companies specialised in the particular field. Each company will be tied to a set time table.

Role of the Iraqi personnel: The project board's General Secretary spoke, in conclusion, about the role of the Iraqi personnel. He emphasised that among the foremost objectives of the board is the training and preparation of Iraqi personnel at the present and in the future. In fact, a number of Iraqi engineers have taken an active part with the

consultants in preparing the preliminary and final studies. Specific plans and programmes will be laid down in order to bring into participation a maximum number of Iraqi personnel from the senior, intermediate and beginner levels. Training and development philosophy, plans and programmes for Iraqi personnel will be drawn up and implemented to enable them to operate the project.

The board has adopted the idea of bringing into participation Iraqi specialist firms. This is already being implemented. Soil investigation works, for example, have been assigned to the national centre of construction laboratories. University personnel will also be brought in to take part.



## ARABISTAN AGRICULTURAL SERVICES EXAMINED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 20 May 81 p 2

[Article by Akram Dhannoun in Mohammara, Arabistan]

[Text] The biggest single agricultural complex in Arabistan, a composite department rendering agricultural services, is now in full operation in the liberated city of Mohammara, Arabistan providing various services to the peasants there.

The complex, evolved from a skeleton office set up to the benefit of Arabistani peasants soon after the liberation of the city by the Iraqi army, has now become a fully staffed department of various divisions. Arabistanis met by this correspondent have high praise for services so far rendered.

All services given by the complex are free of charge including extension advice, facilities to stock breeders and peasants including harvesting, marketing, inoculation and treatment of stocks. The complex provides improved seeds and fertilisers all free of charge.

Extension teams operating from the complex carry out extension services and hold field demonstrations

on how best modern methods could be applied. There are modern workshops to repair agricultural machinery and dredgers clearing irrigation canals.

The complex has divisions for animal health run by veterinarians and technicians, agricultural extension run by a group of extension officers and agriculturists, and divisions for plant protection, agricultural supplies and mechanisation as well.

Arabistani peasants benefit from complex teams working against plant diseases and rendering veterinary services, agricultural extension services, supplies of improved seeds, fertilisers and agricultural machinery. Complex agricultural planes spray plantations with insecticides to combat agricultural plagues.

Extension teams and agriculturists guide peasants on the modern techniques of agriculture and hold field demonstrations for their benefits. Workshops undertake repair of agricultural machinery and tools.

The mechanisation division gives free services for sowing, plowing, cutting irrigation water inlets and supplies machinery. Numerous meetings and field visits were made to acquaint citizens with the means of improved agriculture and farming.

The agricultural complex, which evolved from a simple office, is now teeming with qualified specialists and wide range of supplies to carry out its public services to the benefit of Arabistani countrymen.

# SEMINAR DISCUSSES COOPERATIVE FARM PROBLEMS

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 16 May 81 p 5

[Text] Mr Taha Yassin Ramaddan, Member of the Revolution Command Council, First Deputy Premier, participated in discussions of the State farms work paper, at the seminar organised for this purpose by the Agricultural Engineers Union, Thursday evening.

The Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Irrigation, Planning, the Under secretaries of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Youth, Irrigation, the Chairman and members of the Cooperative Peasants and Societies General Federation, Directors of Establishments of the Agricultural sector, and other officials attended the seminar.

Mr Ramadhan, after listening to discussions by the participants, called for formulating new principles and techniques that would turn State farms into model schools for peasants in all fields.

He explained that "we must define the aims of state-farms, afterwards, we would fix principles of operation that would transform State farms into carrier of modern technology to our countryside."

He denied any intention to abolish State farms emphasizing that the holding of this seminar aimed at exploring the problems faced by these farms.

He urged increased cooperation between State farms, universities and study centres in all fields of agriculture, and the setting up of study centres in each State farm, to solve its problems.

He emphasized the importance of incentives, calling on the farms staff to develop their skills and modernize their techniques.

He also asked the concerned authorities to lay down rules that would make the farms useful economically, taking into account area, administration, profit and loss and a precise annual account.

He said, "though we study experiments of developed nations, we must not copy them outright, but accommodate them to our circumstances." He urged the 'elimination of administrative clogging use of mechanization, without letting this infringe on the role of man, Iraq's first and foremost asset.



After praising the work papers, he decided upon the formation of a committee chaired by Dr Samal Paraj, Under secretary of Agriculture and Agrarian reform and including chairman of concerned establishments, the D. G. of Planning at the Ministry, two university professors, representatives of peasant societies, the Party's Central Peasant Bureau, a specialized member of the Deputy Premier's office.

The purpose of the committee will be to formulate a precise work paper on state farms.

CSO: 4300

## IRRIGATION PROJECTS NEAR COMPLETION

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 20 May 81 p 2

[Article by Clela Khoshaba]

[Text]

Three major irrigation projects are now in the final stage of construction in Iraq. The first, "The Badrah-Jassan Irrigation Project" in Diyala province is being implemented to provide water from the Tigris river to irrigate a total of 165,000 mashara of land in the area of Badrah, Jassan and Zarbatiya. It will consist of a 65 kms long main canal and five electric power stations to overcome the effects of the reverse sloping of the land. Other features include the lining of the canal with concrete to increase efficiency and the construction of water ducts to drain off flood waters as well as sluice regulator and two motor vehicle bridges.

Work on the canal has been completed and it is expected that three of the power stations will be completed by mid 1982.

The beneficiaries of the scheme will include the large state farms at Daboum and Jassan, covering a total area of 100,000 mashara between them.

It is anticipated that the whole project, costing ID. 60 million, will be in full operation by mid 1982.

The second major project is concerned with the construction of sluice regulators on the Hilla and Deghara rivers in Babylon province in order to regulate the flow of water to irrigate the arable land along the banks of the rivers. The plan also allows for the inclusion of canals for navigation and the rivers will be dredged and widened so as to stabilize the flow of water and to increase the amount of water available for irrigation purposes.

The plan also takes into consideration the preservation and improvement of the ecological aspects of the area and part of the water will be used to beautify the town of Hilla. The total cost of this scheme is ID. 24 million.

Finally a contract has been signed to construct an irrigation system to serve an area of 34,000 mashara in the Shaikh Langar area. The project consists of the construction of a main canal and a network of 30 installations which will provide water for irrigation. Work began on this project early this year and altogether ID. 6 million will be spent by the time of its completion.

## BRIEFS

COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH MOROCCO--Iraq and Morocco signed an agreement on joint cooperation in the field of work and manpower. The agreement, signed on behalf of Iraq by Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, Mr Bakr Mahmoud Rasoul, and on Morocco's side by Mr Mohammed Arslan Jadidi, Minister of labour, provides for the recruitment of Moroccan workers to work in Iraq's development programmes. The agreement also calls for encouragement of movement of workers from one country to another as well as other facilities relating to families accompanying them. On this occasion, the Iraqi Minister referred to the importance of joint Arab action and said that such agreements are ideal forms of cooperation between the Arab states leading to the anticipated and advanced standards of growth and reconstruction. In reply Mr Jadidi said that Morocco feels proud of Iraq's victories against the Persian racist enemy and expressed hope that the bilateral relations would witness further progress. [Text] [Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 21 May 81 p 4]

CSO: 4300

## 'ALI KHALIFAH DISCUSSES OIL RESERVES

London 8 DAYS in English 6 Jun 81 pp 46, 47

[Article by Robert Pouliot]

[Text]

*Sheikh Ali Khalifa, Kuwaiti oil minister, talks to ROBERT POULIOT about the revised estimates of the sheikdom's oil reserves, which put it into second place behind Saudi Arabia. He then discusses the success of the Kuwait Petroleum Company, set to become the Third World's largest multinational.*

ADDITIONAL RESERVES of crude oil, estimated at over four billion barrels, have been discovered in Kuwait over the last two years as a result of an intensive exploration drive launched to assess the extent of the sheikdom's reserves. The successful exploration of this amount of oil would theoretically enable Kuwait to maintain production for another 160 years at its current new target production rate of 1.25m b/d, assuming a 100 per cent extraction rate from existing wells.

Aside from the neutral zone Kuwait shares with Saudi Arabia, gas and oil have been discovered at depths of between 5,200 and 7,000 metres in the Greater Burgan field. With the recently discovered oil, Kuwait's reserves stand at 72bn barrels, a figure which puts it ahead of the Soviet Union. (See page 44 for a discussion of Soviet oil reserves.)

This is a dramatic turn round from 10 years ago when a militant opposition was actively criticising the government for a depletion rate that left Kuwait with only 70-80 years of production according to controversial estimates made at the time.

The revised estimate was announced by Kuwait's oil minister, Sheikh Ali Khalifa al Sabah who was, however, reluctant to provide precise figures. 'I don't want to go into that. But given the success ratio we have had in the last two years, I am extremely optimistic. We have in fact been discovering more than we produce. Over that period, we may have discovered more than we produced in the last five years.'

Until last year, exploration in Kuwait had only been carried out to a depth of 1,500-1,800 metres. The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation then embarked on an extensive seismic survey of the whole of western and northern Kuwait below 1,800 metres, as well as offshore areas which are not under dispute. Meanwhile earlier drilling revealed considerable volumes of oil beneath Kuwait City.

According to the oil minister: 'The deep drilling is going on. I think that one gas well was due to be tested in May in Burgan at a depth of 5,200 metres. For another well, we already by-passed what we expect to be the production threshold because we want to hit the basement at around 7,000 metres before we go back and test. That will give us a better picture of the geology of the Magwa field, in the Greater Burgan area. On the oil front, we have been discovering small fields by Kuwaiti standards — large by international standards — and we have an active drilling and exploration programme.'

By the early 1950s the Burgan field, which was discovered and drilled in 1937 at a depth of 1,200 metres, had become the largest known deposit in the world. Magwa was discovered in 1952.

In the late 1970s the Sheikh was stating that his target of production to reserve ratio was 100 years; but that figure was only exceeded last year following a 25 per cent production cut — back to 1.5m b/d. Combined with a further 16 per cent

cut-back, new discoveries have extended the life span of Kuwait's reserves to some 160 years or as much as three times Saudi Arabia's ratio under current public estimates. Only last year, Kuwait tailed behind the Soviet Union by about 2bn barrels of oil, in third position according to American diplomatic sources. For the time being at least, no specific ratio has been set and the sky's the limit.

'I don't know,' said Sheikh Ali when asked about the ratio. 'This is something one assesses as one goes on. There is no magic number (not even a life span of 200 years). The problem relates to development needs and constraints put on your return on international investments together with your expectations about future prices and a number of other factors. Our problem in Kuwait is that we are a one-resource base country and we cannot be too careful. We have limited manpower and limited everything.' With so much oil in a country where the population is estimated at 1.3m-1.5m (including foreigners), Sheikh Ali doubts that there is any possibility that Kuwait might revert one day to a production level of 2m b/d.

In addition to its supervision of the domestic exploration programme centred on the Permian deposits 4,800-6,000 metres below the Greater Burgan field (where major sources of sweet non-associated gas were found in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Iran), the Kuwait Oil Company is examining the possibility of extracting heavy crude in northern Kuwait. Sources indicate that 'the \$5bn-\$6bn project would require steam injection and closely related wells'.

Despite its new activities abroad through either the newly formed Kuwait Overseas Petroleum Exploration Company or the International Energy Development Consortium in Geneva (where Kuwait is working with the multinational Volvo and the Canadian businessman Maurice Strong), the sheikhdom is anxious to find more oil pools to feed its new refining ventures both at home and abroad without depleting its own reserves too severely.

The Kuwait Overseas Petroleum Exploration Company was capitalised at Kuwaiti dinars 100m (\$360m). With a refining capacity of 750,000 b/d scheduled within a few years' time inside Kuwait and the widening participation of the sheikhdom in other refining ventures such

as Pacific Resources Incorporated in Honolulu which has a 68,000 b/d capacity, Kuwait will soon be tying close to two-thirds of its crude output to pre-designated refineries, thus making the market even less flexible. Sheikh Ali was optimistic: 'Especially with the projects we have in mind, I hope that by then the exploration company will be producing some oil ...'

## 'ALI KHALIFAH INTERVIEWED ON OIL POLICY

London 8 DAYS in English 30 May 81 pp 42, 43, 56, 57

[Interview with Sheikh Ali Khalifa by Robert Pouliot]

[Text] DESPITE THE GLOOMY mood prevailing among some oil-producing nations on the eve of the Opec conference in Geneva, Sheikh Ali Khalifa al Sabah of Kuwait foresaw room for compromise.

In a wide-ranging exclusive interview in Kuwait, the man known for his key mediating role within the 13-member organisation and as the main spokesman for Opec's moderates acknowledged the possibility of an extended oil price freeze to bridge the gap between the high-priced extra-light African oil (\$40-41) and the Saudi \$32 marker crude. Both Qatari Oil Minister Sheikh Abdelaziz bin Khalifa al Thani and his Libyan counterpart, Abdessalam Zagar, supported the idea of a freeze to avoid cutting back on nominal prices.

As for the long-term pricing strategy set out last year by a six-nation Opec committee, Sheikh Ali denied that the glut in the world market warranted any special amendment: 'I think that if the formula is perceived again too strictly, it's dead before it is born. I think that all the formula says in essence is that the real price of oil should increase in moderate terms.' However, a number of countries — including Libya, Algeria and Iran — wish to change it in the light of the current glut.

Moreover, Sheikh Ali considered it 'futile' to talk in Geneva about over-production on the part of one exporter, or of a small group of countries, since he believes that 'producers in general

should now reduce their output to allow Iran and Iraq to recapture part of their market.'

Sheikh Ali revealed that:

● Kuwait's decision to trim its average targeted production from 1.5m b/d to 1.25m b/d on 1 April was not related to the glut but resulted from a decision approved six months ago by the sheikhdom's highest authorities.

● Opec could be 'willing' to produce 1.5-2.0m b/d more than the market can bear.

● 'In one way or another,' all supply contracts now in force with Kuwait are subject to premiums ranging from below \$3 to \$7 a barrel above the \$35.5 government selling price.

● Instead of disappearing because of a slackening world market, premiums might be maintained by cutting production within Opec.

● Although Opec's dwindling share of the world market 'would not be a bad thing' and was even advocated by the organisation, 'substitution to alternative sources of energy should not be done too fast, to avoid causing problems both to consumers and Opec nations.'

Sheikh Ali claimed that the threat of the socialist bloc dipping into Gulf reserves 'has been exaggerated beyond reason.' He 'wouldn't see any problem for Comecon countries to buy small quantities of oil.'

Unlike Sheikh Yamani, who claims that the world has now entered a period of glut



engineered by Saudi Arabia' to force more militant Opec members to trim their prices for an overall realignment. Sheikh Ali believes that market pressures remain tolerable.

There is some willingness to produce beyond the willingness to consume, there is no doubt about it. But unless Iran and Iraq restore their production on a large scale, such willingness to overproduce can be contained. If a country wants to produce 2m b/d and is finding outlets for only 1.7m b/d, it still can satisfy itself with a 10 per cent reduced level.

'So the cuts forced upon individual countries by the market remain within a tolerable limit as long as Iran and Iraq return to the market in the limited way we have seen over the last three months. But if both countries were to increase their supplies drastically, with other producers sticking to their current levels of output, a glut would appear on the market.'

While the combined production of Iran and Iraq is now fast approaching 2.5m b/d despite the war along the Shatt al Arab, which diplomatic sources expect to last through 1981, Iraq is reportedly getting ready to export up to 1m b/d by October, through a complex network of Single-Bouy Moorings (SBM) — floating terminals — in the Gulf. Four are now on their way from California, with a capacity of 60,000 b/d per unit.

Sheikh Ali disagreed with Dr Ull Lantke, the International Energy Agency director, who recently estimated the excess supply to be in the range of 1.5 to 2m b/d. He is measuring willingness to produce more than is needed, whether or not producers in fact attained that level. If you add up all the willing production within Opec, you may wind up with that figure.'

Yet the Kuwaiti minister believes that some countries (without naming Saudi Arabia) are producing too much now. Unlike Libya and Venezuela, which recently called upon the Saudis to trim output, Sheikh Ali cautions against specifying particular countries.

I am not enthusiastic about discussing production programming if we concentrate on one country or a small group of countries. If everybody agreed to programme their production according to the only meaningful criteria — reserves — and this were to lead to a unified price system, I would be most happy to take part in the debate.

'But it is completely futile to say country X is over producing, while I know that country Y, while it is producing only 1m or 1.5m, has a much lower reserve-to-production ratio. I am not willing to participate in such a sterile discussion.'

In a bold move two weeks ago, which at first seemed to indicate Kuwait was the latest victim of the slackening world market, the sheikhdom announced that its average target production had been reduced to 1.25m b/d since 1 April, a 50 per cent cut from the output recorded in 1979.

This cutback has nothing to do with current so-called glut conditions at all. It had been planned for more than six months. The Supreme Petroleum Council and the Cabinet approved a policy of reducing our production almost six months ago, scheduled for about this time. In fact, the justification we gave to the oil companies for the supply cut that affected some of them was that we were scheduling a cut in production. It is not a temporary measure and it remains within government policy to lengthen the production period of our fields.'

This new flexible ceiling, liable to go up and down according to a yearly average, would leave Gulf, Shell and British Petroleum with supplies amounting to 250,000 b/d ('give or take 10 per cent') from the reported level of 450,000 b/d under the former contracts.

Kuwait was thereby able to defend its premium policy, although the actual surcharge above the official government price dropped from \$7 last autumn to less than \$3 for the recently renegotiated contracts. 'First of all, we at the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation buy oil from the government of Kuwait at the official price. We provide services such as insuring the stability of our commitment and we should be compensated for this. We think the premium is one way of doing this. We think the supplies from Kuwait are stable, and we treat our customers correctly.'

The way Kuwait reacted on the market may be indicative of what is likely to happen elsewhere within Opec. A slackening demand may gradually brush aside the phenomenon of access premiums or surcharges which has appeared in the wake of the Iranian revolution. The market could play in any direction. It depends on what will happen with supply and demand. I

can foresee that premiums will disappear entirely — or perhaps even increase. But instead of cutting premiums, we could cut supplies. I don't know. When that situation arises, we'll review the situation.

However, because of falling spot market prices that pushed a reconstituted barrel of crude in Europe \$2 or \$3 below the \$36 mainstream crude market price adopted last December in Bali by most producers, Kuwait has no processing deal and 'doesn't even contemplate that kind of agreement as a short-term possibility'.

Sheikh Ali saw no reason for the pricing formula of the long-term strategy to be changed at all. 'I think that if the formula is perceived again too strictly, it is dead before it is born. All this formula is saying is that the real price of oil should increase in moderate terms. No formula is going to be valid for all times, even real value may decline, and it may increase beyond the formula at other times. It merely gives an overall indication.'

'To try to devise a formula of which we are going to become the slaves rather than the masters is an exercise in futility. I think that those who object to the formula don't grasp the intention of the long-term strategy committee.'

Commenting on the underlying factors that might explain the current excess willingness to produce, Sheikh Ali claimed that 'inventories are being depleted to some degree' among oil-consuming nations.

'I believe that this is only natural, not only because interest rates are high (thus boosting the cost of storage) but also because the various players in the market do not foresee a dramatic price increase. So why on earth — even if interest rates were at 10 per cent — would they keep their inventories higher than what is normally required? In the past, certain consumers did accumulate more than what is normally required, as a safety cushion.'

Until two or three months ago — and it is still the case today — inventories exceeded what was needed for normal operations, plus a given safety margin. That would have paid off if consumers expected prices to go up but if not, at least not dramatically, there is no reason for them to keep inventories high.

In a speech made recently in Washington, Opec's deputy secretary-general, Dr Fadhil al Chalabi, warned OECD countries against using their 5bn barrels of strategic stocks to disrupt the market yet further.

While US domestic hydrocarbon supplies increased marginally over the last 12 months, American imports of crude in fact dropped by 26 per cent during the same period (April 1981 over April 1980). This has caused some apprehension among Gulf producers since the cutback in US crude

imports has reached 31 per cent since April 1979.

An illustration of what that trend could mean was given this April when Dr Melvin Conant, president of Conant and Associates (a world energy and resources consulting firm), visited Kuwait at the invitation of the US embassy. He said that if this kind of drop were to continue — the first large drop over the last 25 years in fact — within two or three years the US might not need the 2.5m b/d it now imports from the Gulf, half from Saudi Arabia.

However, Sheikh Ali commented: 'I don't think such independence is possible. America has reduced its demand for foreign oil drastically for two reasons: first the recession, and then conservation efforts. Since the US was producing a large portion of its needs, any cut in consumption would be doubly reflected in imports. So there is an exaggerated drop in imports. The 31 per cent drop since 1979 is not normal, and is even unlikely to continue. Because when the US internal level of production is about fixed, any jump would have to come entirely from outside. So again, any pick-up in demand would reflect doubly on imports.'

'However, decontrol did encourage a small increase in domestic production for both oil and gas. But because the reserve base has not essentially changed, and because the production-to-reserve ratio is still very low, I envisage the increase in output to be only temporary. A lot of analysts in the US share this view rather than the opinion of Dr Conant. So I very much doubt that, within three years, US imports will disappear — and even if that were to happen, I don't think it should imply a revision of strategic thinking.'

But hasn't the 'second oil shock' made alternative energy sources more competitive and dented Opec's share of world supplies permanently? Strangely enough, the same old ball game as the one

played after 1973-1974 has begun to reappear since last year.

'In a sense,' claimed Sheikh Ali, 'that would not be a bad thing. In fact, Opec had been advocating a policy for its share of the oil market to fall in percentage terms. That doesn't mean that Opec's share dwindling, let's say from 60 to 40 per cent, will cause the organisation to disintegrate or to go bust. Some people assume that a lower percentage is bad for Opec. In my opinion, this is wrong, because it is a stated objective of Opec to encourage energy conservation and stimulate alternative energy sources.

Some people expect Opec to fall apart because of such a drop. Don't forget that 40 per cent is as meaningful as 60 per cent. The problem is that substitution shouldn't be done too fast, so as to avoid squandering away global resources and creating more problems both for consumers and for Opec than is advisable.

There is no simple arithmetical formula for a yearly 5 per cent drop in Opec's share. It can't remain at the previous 60 to 65 per cent because our resources are being depleted. Again, I don't envisage Opec's share going to 20 per cent, because that would cause such a squandering of global resources going into alternative energy and to other oil sources that the world in general would suffer.

If the market drifts away from oil by itself, we would not discourage it. But it is our responsibility to guard against forcing the market to shift in a given direction. In a sense we could either allow prices to be eroded so that the world becomes completely dependent on oil, or push them so high that we encourage wasteful use of other resources. This has not happened so far and it is far from happening now, but I am saying that there are two extremes one should guard against.

As regards Comecon's interest in the Gulf, Sheikh Ali does not share the pessimistic view of some of his colleagues that the Soviet Union might intervene over oil. 'I think this is an exaggeration. The USSR's reserve base for oil, gas and coal is huge. They may have to go into more difficult areas for oil, but reserves are still enormous.

'They have about 15 to 20 per cent of total world gas reserves, and that is considerable. The same applies to coal. Barring some difficulties--which would last less than a decade--the USSR will continue to be a net exporter. Meanwhile, I foresee the Soviet Union pushing nuclear energy, so the picture is exaggerated.

'As for the need for the Comicon countries to come in the market to get oil, if there is such a reduced demand in the West, and if those socialist countries come to buy oil in small amounts, I don't see any problems at all.'

## KPC'S RAPID GROWTH CITED

London 8 DAYS in English 6 Jun 81 pp 46, 47

[Text]

SUPPORTED by a fast-growing network of eight basic subsidiaries and associated operating companies, the state-owned Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) is on the way to becoming the Third World's largest multinational company.

If you mean by that a company which has investments throughout the world, the answer is yes, we are seeking investment opportunities on an international scale whenever it is profitable and suits our purposes. But we are not doing it just because we want to be a multinational, oil minister Sheikh Ali Khalifa told 8 Days.

In late January 1980, Kuwait announced a major reorganisation of its oil industry in a move to rationalise further the activities of four basic operating entities: the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), the Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC), the Petrochemical Industries Company (PIC) and the Kuwait Oil Tankers Company (KOTC). Since then KPC has established the Kuwait International Petroleum Investments Company (KPIC), together with a 30 per cent Kuwaiti public participation, to invest in refining, petrochemicals, oil transportation (including pipelines) and storage, plus, more recently, the Kuwait Overseas Exploration Company, besides participating in a number of exploration and refining ventures abroad.

The holding company co-ordinates long-term overall strategy, while the subsidiaries deal with the shorter term.

It seems that as far as rationalisation goes, we have been extremely successful,' said Sheikh Ali Khalifa. 'I think that today we have an extremely efficient machine

working in the oil sector inside Kuwait. Outside we either go into investments that complement our work strategically and allow us to draw on certain areas where we have a gap in our organisation, or look at investment opportunities that are lucrative.

'In the first instance, for example, we lacked a flexible engineering outfit. This we tried to complement by taking a large share in Metallgesellschaft, which has a good subsidiary in that field. KPC owns 20 per cent of Metallgesellschaft and has just appointed one of the directors to the company's supervisory board.

'In other instances, we obviously know more about oil marketing and refining than about making steel. It is only reasonable that we would invest in the oil sector: we might not have as much knowledge as Exxon, but from our point of view, it is better than our experience in, let's say, electronics. Our investments in oil-related industries might thus reward us with higher returns than in other areas of activities.'

KPC signed an agreement on 22 April to set up a 50-50 joint venture with Pacific Resources Incorporated, a Honolulu-based independent refiner aiming at a regional market. Under the deal, KPC is committed to supply half of the refinery's 67,900 b/d requirement.

'First of all, we found a refinery that is extremely profitable and a market that is growing, unlike that of much of the industrial world,' said the oil minister. 'The Pacific region is experiencing a growth rate higher than, say, the US or Europe in general. We were exporting to that region, but we wanted a presence there in order to

maximise and protect our position. We were exporting some gas oil in the area.

'Pacific Resources was essentially an oil refining company which could grow and had a very good, intelligent and aggressive management who wanted to expand. The fact that we didn't come and buy PRI shares but rather said: "OK, what is the value of your refinery and marketing operations? Let's shake hands on figure, and instead of paying you \$90m of that, we'll pay you \$185m, but it will be a joint operation. Now, you don't only have a refinery but also financial resources besides." The plans to expand over a 10-year period could be cut to two or three years. In addition, at one time they were hesitant about expansion because of the lack of crude. So we matched security of crude with additional volumes that will give them an advantage to expand and remove points of uncertainty in supply terms.

'As for petrochemicals, I don't know whether they would go in . . . our agreement with the management is that we will look at opportunities that will enhance the overall return. What those opportunities are is too soon to say: it's an open door.'

This comes on top of a major expansion and upgrading of Kuwait's refining industries. Although it is premature to pin an exact figure for this vast modernisation programme, aimed at extracting lighter fractions from the country's medium quality crude, Sheikh Ali Khalifa estimates that the overall cost will be about \$3bn: 'It is difficult to assess because essentially we don't use contractors for a turnkey job. We manage those contracts ourselves, in the sense that we subcontract bits and pieces rather than the whole project.'

At the 250,000 b/d Mina Ahmadi refinery, which was transferred to KNPC from KOC under the reorganisation plan, storage capacity will increase, installations — including a desulphurisation unit — will be modernised, while the gasoline yield will be boosted further. The ambitious \$1.5-2bn Mina Abdulla refinery expansion project aims at nearly doubling the capacity to 250,000 b/d under the rationale that current low throughput (around 80,000 b/d of Wafra crude) is due to the low value of its finished products, as is the case with the Ahmadi refinery. Only the 200,000 b/d Shuaiba plant now is of modern design.

CSO: 4300/18

## KUWAIT

### RASH OF SEX OFFENSES SHOCKS NATION

Paris AL-WATAN AL-ARABIC in Arabic 23 Apr 81 p 15

[Article: "Kuwait: She Went out And Has Not Returned"]

[Text] She went out -- and has not yet returned!

This electrifying news has become a sign of a new crime in Kuwait.

For a period of time, Kuwaiti society has been experiencing a series of vile crimes, in spite of the alertness of security agencies and the efforts they are making.

A Pakistani girl, Shazia, ended up strangled and buried under the sands of the desert as a consequence of perverse sexual motives, after two other girls, a Palestinian and a Bengali.

While security authorities were arresting the people who committed the crimes, another criminal was climbing the wall of a villa, when its owner was absent, to commit aggression against his wife and daughter. His weapon was a piece of cloth soaked with chloroform.

Before the police took over the case, a similar incident occurred at 0300 hours, at dawn, but failed.

The Kuwaiti press gave prominence to news of these crimes, considering them to be unknown to Kuwait. Many diverse moral crimes had previously occurred, over the past years, but they were not so concentrated, repeated or sophisticated either.

Before the newspaper published pictures of the criminals, and the details of the crimes they committed, the news of these vile crimes had entered every home in Kuwait's small society, which was standing on its tiptoes with terror. Fathers and mothers began following every step their children made, standing with them while waiting for schoolbuses in the morning, waiting for them at the door when they returned at noon, closing the doors tight, and installing additional locks. Children ceased to go out of houses except for real necessity, and when they did they kept their eyes to the rear as they moved forward.



That is the real tale of fear which has prevailed in the various areas of Kuwait and presented itself at the various levels of responsibility in the government. The National Assembly devoted a session to discussing the security situation.

Dealing with the phenomenon is not the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior alone, said the crown prince and prime minister, Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Sabah, in the statement he made to the National Assembly on the security situation -- adding that there were many elements in the commission of the crimes, including social ones and educational ones as well, all of which had to be studied by experts and people specializing in the matter so that we could arrive at a formula which would guarantee the stability and security of all citizens.

He said,

"It is out of the question to eliminate crime, but it is not out of the question or difficult to reduce the crime rate. The world is full of incidents and full of developments, contradictions, struggles and bloody clashes, and everything that happens abroad will probably happen in Kuwait because we cannot live in isolation from the world!

After this, the police are hoping to put a quick limit to the climate of fear.

11887

CSO: 4802/722

## BACKSTAGE DETAILS OF AL-QADHDHAFI MOSCOW VISIT DISCUSSED

LD151037 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 10 May 81 p 18

[Report by Shakir al-Jawhari: "Al-Qadhdhafi Ambitions Go Beyond Soviet Strategy; Moscow Refused To Deal With Steadfastness Front as a Single Group and Wants To Deal With Each Country Separately"]

[Text] Moscow--The discussion at the dinner table of the Rossiya Hotel in Moscow was about the success of Libyan leader Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi's visit to Moscow. A senior Libyan official who accompanied al-Qadhdhafi on his tour of Bulgaria, the Soviet Union and Yugo. avia and attended the talks with the leaders of the three countries asked: Did you read Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal's book about Egyptian-Soviet relations during Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's rule? Answering his own question, the Libyan official said: Haykal said in his book that joint statements used to be issued about 'Abd al-Nasir's visit to Moscow which spoke of total agreement and strong Arab-Soviet friendship, while the reality of the matter showed a wide gulf between what 'Abd al-Nasir used to request from the Soviets and what he would obtain from them.

The Libyan official declined to discuss the details of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's Moscow mission and his talks with Soviet leaders and was content to relate what Haykal wrote as an allusion.

Apparently the Soviets are masters of the subtle hint. There is no doubt that from the outset they understood the significance of the Libyan leader's visit in his capacity as a representative of the steadfastness and confrontation front and not just as Libyan leader because this visit was decided on at the summit conference which the leaders of this front held in Damascus more than a year ago.

The mission entrusted to al-Qadhdhafi then was to urge the Soviets to boost the quantity and quality of the arms they give to Syria. The decision was taken following clear hints by Syria of the existence of difficulties in relations with Moscow over arms supplies.

Of course, between that time and the date of the Libyan leader's arrival in Moscow, more than a year elapsed during which many developments and events occurred. Syrian-Soviet relations became excellent and a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed between the two countries which is supposed to have

resolved the issues concerning the arming of Syria. But on the other hand new problems have arisen concerning Libya in particular and the countries of Tripoli Charter in general that need a clear stand on Moscow's part.

During a brief meeting with Colonel al-Qadhdhafi in Moscow on the first night of his visit I asked him: What did you ask Brezhnev on behalf of the steadfastness and confrontation front?

The colonel said: "I asked President Brezhnev to develop the Soviet military and political stand in favor of the steadfastness and confrontation front." Al-Qadhdhafi declined to discuss his demands in detail, but the atmosphere of the visit indicated that Libya had many demands as well as many observations to make.

Although the Libyan leadership has explained to the Soviet Union several times the circumstances under which Libyan forces were sent into Chad, Moscow gave no signs that it supports the Libyan intervention. Moscow was also careful not to express any support for the POLISARIO Front in the Western Sahara because of Moscow's good economic relations with Morocco, from which it imports large quantities of phosphates. This issue also concerns Algeria, another member of the steadfastness and confrontation front. The problems of Chad and the Sahara are in the final analysis a part of the Libyan strategy in the African continent, and the Soviet attitude toward them is bound to affect negatively or positively Soviet policy not only in Africa but in the world as well.

Libyan policies in the African continent became clear during al-Qadhdhafi's visit to Algeria and Mauritania before his visit to Moscow. He called for the establishment of an alliance to include these two countries, the POLISARIO and Libya. He also called for the inclusion of the POLISARIO in the steadfastness and confrontation front. Al-Qadhdhafi's aim behind this tour [of Algeria and Mauritania] was to find out the real potential of his moves in Africa in order to put specific requests to the Soviets in this regard.

In this interview with AL-WATAN al-Qadhdhafi was anxious to stress the non-identity of the stands of the steadfastness and confrontation states and the Soviet Union because "an identity of stands with a superpower would mean that we are acting as agents," as al-Qadhdhafi says.

But in view of the lack of identical stands and views, how can the friendship between the steadfastness and confrontation front and the Soviet Union continue?

Al-Qadhdhafi himself answered this question when I put it to him. Al-Qadhdhafi said he is aware that the Soviet Union, as a superpower, has a comprehensive global strategy and that this strategy views the Middle East as one of the areas of conflict in the world and not the whole world [sentence as published]. Any Soviet stand on the Middle East is bound to affect the Soviet strategy in other parts of the world. However, there is agreement with the Soviet Union on the general policy line of combating world imperialism and the forces of counterrevolution in the world.

Nevertheless, the Libyan-Soviet talks encountered many difficulties, and the Soviets faced Libyan pressures of a kind they had not met before. Some Soviet actions did not please al-Qadhafi, the reason for this being the wide distance between al-Qadhafi's demands to the Soviet leadership and the extent of such response to these demands as can be allowed by a Soviet strategy which is usually inflexible.

When al-Qadhafi landed at Moscow airport wearing a military uniform the Soviet leader Brezhnev understood the significance of this. He was careful to include in the second paragraph of the speech he made at the dinner in honor of al-Qadhafi a reference of great significance. Brezhnev said "our countries differ greatly from one another, particularly ideologically." Another signal that Moscow disapproved of the demands of the steadfastness and confrontation front was the Soviet protocol officials refusal to allow the Libyan television and radio crew to attend the dinner ceremony in order to record and film al-Qadhafi's speech.

The following day it was noticed that the Soviet media ignored the part of his speech in which al-Qadhafi demanded that Moscow adopt a firm stand by giving political and military support to the Arabs and display more effective support for the steadfastness and confrontation front. Al-Qadhafi agreed with me that the refusal to allow the filming of his speech was not a matter of protocol but for fear that his speech might include statements embarrassing to the Soviet leadership.

Al-Qadhafi did not miss the chance to reply to the behavior of the Soviet protocol officials. The following morning the same officials were waiting at Lenin's tomb for the arrival of the Libyan leader and the delegation accompanying him. But al-Qadhafi did not arrive as scheduled. At al-Qadhafi's request the muezzin summoned people for prayer in Moscow's big mosque; it was the first time there had been a public muezzin call in Moscow.

Of course, the foregoing were signs of differences in views between both sides and were tantamount to the continuation of negotiations outside of closed doors. Despite the negative aspect of these signs, they seem to have contributed to ironing out certain difficulties which the drafting of the joint statement faced although the agreement on the final draft of the statement was delayed 1 day.

The difficulties particularly centered on the following points:

First, the situation in Lebanon: The Soviet leaders do not think that the situation in Lebanon is as important to them as it is to the steadfastness and confrontation states because the influence of the Lebanese situation on the balances of international conflicts remains limited unless a Syrian-Israeli war breaks out on Lebanese territory. It is also because Moscow does not want to adopt a practical stand in Lebanon in favor of the steadfastness and confrontation front. It has avoided adopting the required stand--by agreeing to charging Yugoslavia with carrying out preliminary contacts with a view to

launching an initiative to contain the situation, an initiative that can be developed to activate efforts to reach a settlement and which could provide the Soviet Union with the opportunity to be in control of the steps toward a settlement alongside the Americans. [sentence as published]

Second, the Libyan military presence in Chad. In this regard the Soviet leaders feel that Libyan policy does not serve Soviet strategy. Rather, it might put on it additional burdens because of the prevalent belief in international quarters that Moscow is responsible for Libya's policy throughout Africa--a belief which is contrary to truth and reality.

When the Soviets were arguing the question of Chad they called for the withdrawal of the Libyan forces from it as soon as their mission is accomplished and the colonel surprised them by demanding Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan because, if Soviet support for Libya in Chad embarrasses Moscow in certain quarters, Libya's support for Moscow in Afghanistan embarrasses Tripoli in the Islamic world.

In view of this it was agreed to include in the joint communique a reference to "the positive role that the Jamahiriyah's legitimate aid played in restoring peaceful conditions to this country [Chad]."

Third, the situation in Western Sahara. Moscow again here refused to include in the joint statement any reference to this problem and in the end agreement was reached on a draft that would not harm Morocco. The statement was limited to affirming "the need to find a solution for the problem of Western Sahara (not the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic) in accordance with the UN resolutions on the right of the Saharan people to self-determination."

Fourth, the Iraq-Iran war. After a long discussion the joint statement contained an "expression of great concern for the continuing conflict between Iran and Iraq and the attempt by imperialism to exploit this conflict for its narrow interests." The statement supported efforts for peaceful settlement of the conflict. The statement did not contain any reference to the Iranian revolution at the insistence of the Soviet side which expressed its strong annoyance with Iran's anti-Moscow stands, also the Soviet leadership was anxious not to undermine its relations with Iraq while getting nothing in return from Iran.

Fifth, at the insistence of the Soviet leaders the statement was free from any reference to the fact that al-Qadhdhafi represented the steadfastness and confrontation front in his talks because Moscow prefers not to deal with the front as a whole but with each country separately.

With regard to Gulf security, a long time was devoted to discussing this subject and long paragraphs in the joint statement mentioned it. This subject in particular was shrouded in great secrecy by both sides and the joint statement said only the following:

"Upon reviewing the situation in the Gulf region and the Red Sea the two sides strongly denounced the repeated attempts by the United States and other imperialist countries to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries



of this area and the building up of air and naval forces in this area which thereby pose a danger to peace. The two sides consider the establishment of U.S. bases on the territories of the island of Diego Garcia, of Egypt, Oman, Kenya and Somalia as constituting a great danger to the independence of the countries of the area. They strongly oppose the establishment of military and political blocs in this part of the world and call for the creation of an atmosphere of stability and calm there on the basis of ensuring the sovereign rights of its countries and the safety of maritime communications and other communications linking the world."

When the statement dealt with the Afghan question it called for the need to stop all forms of interference in Afghanistan without referring to any Libyan praise for Soviet support for President Karmal's government. It said that "the international aspects of the Afghanistan problem can be subject to separate discussion in conjunction with issues of security in the Gulf region."

There is no doubt that this reference is of great significance because it satisfies the Libyan demand for solving the Afghanistan problem and also meets the Soviet demand for the Gulf states to be neutral in the East-West conflict. It is also an important Soviet concession to al-Qadhdhafi in addition to the other two concessions on the Sahara and Chad.

How successful was al-Qadhdhafi's visit to Moscow?

The Libyan secretary for foreign liaison replied to this question which I put to him at breakfast in Belgrade before leaving for Damascus and Kuwait. He said: "In politics there is no measure of success. But success can always be achieved if the outlines of policies agree."

Commenting on al-Turayki's statement, a veteran Libyan diplomat said: If there were no differences in views what need is there for visits and talks? It would have been possible in this case, if there were no differences, to substitute visits with instructions to be carried out without discussion.

Finally, al-Qadhdhafi's recent visit to Moscow has proved that Arab ambitions still go far beyond the Soviet strategy in the Arab area.

CSO: 4504/9



## LIBYA

## BRIEFS

**FRENCH SHIP PURCHASES**--France decided on 28 February not to deliver the patrol boats ordered by Libya from the French CMN [expansion unknown] shipyards, because of the role played by Tripoli in Chad. The first fast patrol boat in the Combattante II G series, launched 28 June 1979, was due for delivery to Tripoli in February. This is the Beir Grassa 518 (on our cover). Libya had ordered 10 fast missile-launching patrol boats in August 1977, for a sum of approximately 3 billion French Fr. Three patrol boats are presently at Lorient, two at Cherbourg, and five under construction in the latter city. A hundred Libyan sailors are on site at Cherbourg and Lorient, but only French sailors are on board the boats. **Names of vessels:**

Ordered from the French CMN shipyards, the ten fast missile-launching patrol boats of type Combattante II G, which were placed under embargo by the French Government on 28 January, are named as follows: Beir Grassa 518, launched 28 June 1979; Beir Gtifa 524, launched 20 May 1980; Beir Glulud 526, launched 30 September 1980; Beir Algandula 528, launched 14 January 1981; Beir Ktitat 532, launched 4 April 1981; Beir Alkuefat 542, laid down 20 January 1981; Beir Qzir 522, launched 22 January 1980; Beir Alkrarim 534 and Beir Alkardmen 536, laid down 9 June 1980, and Beir Alkur 538, laid down 20 October 1980. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE DEFENSE in French Apr 81 p 87 6145]

**ITALIAN AIRCRAFT DELIVERIES**--Deliveries of the first Aeritalia G.222T aircraft to the Libyan Army have begun, the first two planes of a lot of 20 having been delivered in February. In addition, according to certain sources, negotiations are in progress for the purchase of a second lot of 20 more G.222Ts. [Text] [Paris DEFENSE INTERARMES in French May 81 p 77 6145]

6145

CSO: 4820/69

DEVELOPMENTAL PROBLEMS OF GULF COUNTRIES DISCUSSED

London 8 DAYS in English 6 Jun 81 pp 10-16

[Article by Paul Barker]

[Text]

*Urban development in the Gulf continues apace, as governments and municipalities get to grips with the considerable task of organising an orderly modernisation and expansion of their often-overtaxed city services. Complexities abound, and are caused as much by the problems of defining the style and type of development to aim for as the practical considerations required to carry them through. PAUL BARKER provides a country-by-country analysis of the development dilemmas.*

AIR POLLUTION and traffic problems in the capital are alienating just those members of the population on whom the country's conservative government ought to be able to rely. The recent newspaper comment actually refers to Athens, but the writer's remarks could just as well apply to Riyadh, Jeddah, Abu Dhabi City, Kuwait, Doha or Manama. Bahrain has in fact been roused in the last month by urgent debate on the island's growing traffic congestion and whether a metro system might solve the problem, furthermore, according to the director of water supplies, Isa al Binali, Bahrain is facing one of the worst water crises in its history. In Dubai, fire risk from the industries set up along the creek has

produced a call from Sheikh Rashid for all firms to move to Jebel Ali, while in Jeddah there are reports that the cement company based there has been forced to relocate because it was polluting the town's atmosphere.

These are a few random examples of the awareness of urban problems shown in the Gulf region, and instances where money and forward planning might save the day. But there are facets of urbanisation that the Gulf governments will find more difficult to tackle, and the rapid migration to major towns will present serious challenges to continued conservative government.

Urban problems come in various shapes and sizes: physical, administrative, manpower-oriented, financial, and security-based. But clearly the fundamental problem is population growth. The Gulf area is situated in the high fertility region of southwest Asia, and the accompanying table shows the population growth figures for Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, Qatar and Kuwait over the last five years.

The high birth rate in these countries is not the only factor contributing to the massive urbanisation of the last few years. In population terms the improvement of health facilities has increased life expectancy in countries like Saudi Arabia from 38 years in 1960 to 53 in 1978, and in Kuwait from 60 years to 69 years over the same period. Immigrants have also swelled the population. But urban growth has been even more spectacular: in the case of Saudi Arabia it is estimated that the urban

percentage of the total has risen from 30 to 67 per cent in the last 20 years while in Kuwait already very much over 50% — the increase has been from 72 per cent to 88 per cent.

Higher wages for jobs connected with the oil industry and the increase in government employment have drawn nationals into the towns, leaving the agriculture sector neglected. For every extra person who decides to live in a town, there is a corresponding demand for water, housing, electricity, telephones and energy. Whereas in the countryside most Gulf nationals live a self-sufficient life, this is impossible in a modern town. And if citizens do continue to try and meet their own needs, the result is the kind of chaotic development that eventually strains the patience of all urban dwellers and manifests itself in such ugly forms as petty crime, slums and mass population.

It is for the Gulf governments to try and minimise the inconveniences involved. But — it has to be said on closer examination of the problem — there are a number of constraints militating against good urban management. It cannot be denied that the various governments have been ready in principle to spend large sums in an attempt to make their cities decent places to live in, but urban problems are so broad in scope that they are handled by a number of different ministries and other organisations — sometimes without the necessary coordination. The sight of raw sewage pouring into streets is not uncommon in the Gulf states, but it is no longer caused by a lack of sewerage systems: an incompatible pipe specification may have been used by a contractor building a block of flats for a private housing company.

Sometimes the lack of coordination is self-inflicted: planning permission is given or withheld depending on an argument that is irrelevant to the town's utility network for several years. In the famous case of the British Rash Housing Programme — in itself a commendable attempt to clear the worst black slums exploding on the edge of the city — the problem was allocation. A special committee had to be set up to adjudicate the respective claims of a great number of Saudis, and the flats weren't occupied for many months after being handed over to the government by the contractor.

As for Saudi Arabia, it is important to note that the government has decided the despatch of all national capability for housing management. As part of the target of the Long-term Socio-Economic Plan is to

place a greater onus of responsibility on the provinces and towns. The government's moves take two forms: one is for the district governors to be given more authority, a step that is to be written into a districts code to be drawn up by a committee under the chairmanship of Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz, the Riyadh district governor; the other is for mayors and heads of municipal councils to be given greater authority, and this has been promised by Prince Muhib bin Abdulaziz, who, as minister of public works and housing and acting minister of municipal and rural affairs, is in the best position to reduce the burden of bureaucratic centralisation on local officials.

But good intentions are not on their own enough to win the day, and there are considerable obstacles thrown up by other pressing national security and economic interests. Manpower is one that immediately springs to mind. Some of the blue-collar jobs — drain maintenance, street repairs, garbage collection — are not the kinds of employment dear to the hearts of most Gulf nationals. The Saudis, for instance, have already granted several street cleaning contracts to foreign firms. The likelihood is that many of the clerical staff necessary in municipal councils would also have to be drawn from abroad, and it is clear that if this area of government services is to keep pace with increases in urban growth, it will dent the various Gulf governments' attempts to reduce the numbers of expatriate workers in their countries.

These governments also have to face up to the fact that their basic economic philosophy fits uneasily with the form of state intervention that efficient urban management requires. In honouring their commitment to the private sector, they have reaped an uncomfortable legacy of property scandals and speculation: rents have been forced up unscrupulously, leaving the citizen just arrived from the country with little option but to drift towards the shanty town areas on the outskirts of the major cities. A dedication to private ownership has also minimised the government's ability to do anything much about the growing

### Gulf population statistics 1975-1980

	1975 (in thousands)	1980 (in thousands)	Annual Growth (per cent)	Urban population (per cent)
Saudi Arabia	7,013	8,696	3.6	67
Bahrain	249	294	3.4	80
UAE	666	950	11.4	84
Qatar	200	260	6.5	88
Kuwait	995	1,337	5.9	88

traffic problem, everyone wants to own a car and expects to be able to drive it where and how he wants.

But even if the Gulf leaders were able to adopt a more regulated approach to the management of life in their larger cities, it is possible this might produce a whole host of new problems. For a start, a lot of red tape always seems to breed corruption, as industrialists pay off inspectors not to enforce safety regulations, as contractors persuade planners to give them building permits, and so on. Corruption has already become a sensitive issue in the award of water supply and power contracts for many Gulf cities, and would be a most unwelcome arrival elsewhere in the bureaucratic chain. There is also an economic problem involved in running a large and predominantly unproductive state sector, namely that the government has to find the money to meet its wage bill.

As the civil service grows in the Gulf states, there is mounting evidence that a potentially serious divergence of opinion exists between employers and employees on how administrators should be remunerated for their services. The present structure of Gulf economies means that almost all government revenue comes in the form of dollar income from oil exports; the collection of what local taxes can be raised is slack, and would if tightened entail a further increase in public sector manning levels. As a result, the government is not particularly keen to increase local currency salaries as this would mean money supplied, and the dangers of inflation; instead the governments provide basic dollar salaries for imported goods and other goods and services like electricity and other services.

This would work quite well if it were not for the fact that the present economic climate has allowed the private sector to prosper almost beyond belief. And now

those civil servants who do not actually leave to work in private enterprise are beginning to insist that they should be given the choice of how they spend their money, rather than see the government perform the task via subsidies.

The Saudi Arabian authorities have just acknowledged the problem by making a hefty increase in civil service salaries, but a leading Saudi economist can still identify a tension in the way Saudi wealth is distributed in the towns. 'The way this wealth is spread to the population favours those who own business establishments and to a lesser extent those who work for them,' he feels. 'And the reason for that is traceable to the fact that those who work for the government receive fixed wages and salaries, the purchasing power of which is continuously falling, to inflation. Those in the private sector, on the other hand, sell their services in the open market and are able to benefit from shortages.'

The tensions and problems produced by rapid urbanisation have tended to be met with two standard reactions by Gulf governments, other than their ad hoc attempts to try and keep physical infrastructure schemes and secondary services in line with demand: one approach has been to put faith in completely new towns, the other has been to spread the services available to urban dwellers to rural dwellers, regardless of the cost. The latter tactic answers the criticism that the urban population is the segment of the population that benefits most from economic growth, because of its access to free or subsidised government services; it is also hoped that such an approach could lessen the attraction of the towns. Saudi Arabia, with the largest rural population, has been strongest exponent of this strategy. In a rare newspaper interview at the beginning of the year, King Khaled said that the government

was currently undertaking studies to provide citizens in rural areas with the services ordinarily found in urban centres, to enable these citizens to remain in their home villages. But wages as well as services will have to be improved if this tactic is to work, and raising the price of agricultural goods would counterbalance the battle to keep down inflation.

The new town strategy adds up to a massive vote of confidence in the science of town planning. There are several drawbacks to this thinking however. Most of the Gulf new towns — Jebel Ali, Ruwais, Umm Said, Mina Abiulla, Jubail and Yanbu — are industrial complexes based on capital-intensive heavy industry, where the workforce is heavily biased in favour of expatriate labour. The attraction to locals of living in these new towns is not that great; they may well prefer to commute from the nearby capital city, or in Saudi Arabia adopt the prevalent bachelor-style existence during the week, returning home at the weekend.

The other problem with new towns is that often they affect the neighbouring older towns, which are often developed by private interests in tandem with the new communities. The familiar atmosphere of these older towns makes them more attractive to industrial workers, but creates exactly those urban headaches the planners hoped to avoid by building a new town. In Qatar, the journey by road to Umm Said — only 50 km south of Doha — is made even more unwelcome by the fact that the stretch of one of the villages en route is continually divided by erect road blocks of protest at the intrusion of central government cars and lorries.

Another type of new town is emerging at an alternative to mass urban centres, the satellite town. Bahrain already has Issa Town, which provides low-income housing for around 8,000 Bahrainis, while Umm Yousuf, a town of Saudi Arabia recently directed by the House of Fakhriyah Mohammed Saud Fakhri, is carrying out comprehensive studies of the creation of four satellite towns around the city of Umm al-Qaywayn, a town of 20,000 people.

Towns are a rather depressing way to deal with urban problems, although they certainly facilitate the provision of orderly services.

But perhaps the most radical solution to the urban problems facing the Gulf is hinted at in a policy statement that appears in the municipalities section of the Saudi Five Year Plan documentation, to the effect that studies should be conducted into the possibility of developing revenues from user costs in respect of municipal services (in other words, making the customer pay for what he receives). It seems fairly likely that self-financing municipal services could do much to solve some of the more immediate urban problems: funds would be available for both current and development expenditure, relieving the ministers concerned from the need to compete with the more heavyweight ministries, such as defence, for funds. Civil service income could be bolstered by local currency receipts, avoiding the present difficulties caused by conflict between the local currency and dollar-denominated components of the state budget. An economic

charge for water and electricity would ensure less wastage of these increasingly expensive commodities, and avoid the embarrassment of power cuts or water rationing. Finally, if citizens felt they were paying directly for such services as garbage disposal, post delivery or even telephones, the systems could well run more efficiently.

The last option is the least likely to be adopted, as it runs counter to the existing economic structures and also to the psychology of the newly urbanised nationals, who have scant understanding of the economics of urban management. And yet it is by letting market forces speak loudly in this vital area — and they are already allowed free voice in other areas — that the Gulf rulers can best tackle a problem that touches the very heart of the modern societies they are striving so hard to create. Governments would be ill-advised to think that the responsibility for solving all urban problems is uniquely theirs: the participation of the consumer is vital here and in other areas of life in the Gulf, if frustration is not to swell to dangerous proportions.

## STUDY SHOWS LOW CRIME RATE IN SAUDI ARABIA

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 22 May 81 p 7

[Article by Adnan Sadeq]

[Text] RIYADH — Amidst the growing population of both Saudi Arabians and expatriates in the country, as well as the continuous building expansion, there is noticeable increase in the number of crimes, ranging between 0.2 and 0.3 percent. But this ratio is far less than the proportion of population explosion in a developing country like Saudi Arabia.

A progressive society with ambitious development plans, such as Saudi Arabia, cannot be free from crimes, even the word "crimes" in such a tradition-oriented society is considered a relative expression. Some crimes, which take place in Saudi Arabia, may not be considered crime in other countries, such as the drinking of intoxicants or physical intimacy with a marriageable person. But these are crimes in Saudi Arabia, because the country takes its inspiration from divine law.

No society is free from crimes like murder, theft, rape, drug abuse and so on. But if we compare the ratio of such crimes in Saudi Arabia with any other country of the world, we will find that the number of such crimes is very small. This again is the result of following divine law and its application to every walk of life. The criminal is punished, tooth for a tooth and eye for an eye, under the Quranic injunctions.

We can say that crime in Saudi Arabia has not yet reached the stage of a major social problem and also that organized crime and gangsterism do not exist in this country. The crimes that take place are mostly of an individual nature, reflecting old Arab habits such as blood revenge or its like. Murders in the Kingdom, if examined, will be found mostly committed by mistake or on the basis of per-

sonal disputes which sometimes reach the ferocity of brutal beating to death. As far as pre-meditated murder, or with the intention of theft, is concerned, they seldom happen. For example, there has been only one every three years, according to the statistics of the past 10 years from 1970 to 1980.

**Common Crimes**

The cohesive nature of Saudi Arabian society as well as economic abundance are factors that keep crime at a low rate — 12 to 20 crimes per year — and also encourage cooperation in apprehending the criminals. On the other hand, the presence of a good number of expatriate workers has led to the spread of some crimes which were not common before, such as the sale and use of tranquilizer pills and or narcotics. This leads to disputes and quarrels which develop into violently bloody, murderous incidents, because the drug-addict loses control of his mind in a state of drug-induced rage.

**State Measures to Combat Crimes**

There are many ways of combating crimes in accordance with the Islamic law, which is enforced in Saudi Arabia both in letter and in spirit. The Kingdom does not adopt positive laws, but acts upon the Islamic law revealed through the Holy Quran beginning with religious orientation, the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice, the hatred of crime and the penalizing of its perpetrator.

Next comes in the second level of deterrent and suppressive measures, followed by a reformatory measure at the third level. (Prisons in Saudi Arabia have intensive programs for education, vocational training and social welfare for the inmates.) In this behalf, the state follows the policy of reform based on the Quranic principle, which says: "God commands with justice and beneficence." The state acts with justice as far as possible, but deals resolutely with the criminal. The act of beneficence is to reform the convicts and return them to society as equal people with-



out being subjected to any rancor, or demoralized by the disgrace of a crime, but only if it is proved that they are determined to repent and to lead an upright life.

#### **Cause of Kingdom Crime**

There are many reasons for committing crime, some of which are related to the criminal himself on the basis of his psychic structure and his tendency toward aggression, which some others are conditioned by the surrounding circumstances. Provocation and assault might lead to the commitment murder that takes blood revenge or wipes out an insult. There can also be some other illegal means, such as bribery, to obtain funds, but not every person in Saudi Arabia is, by nature, prone to criminal acts. They take place on psychological grounds only if one absolves oneself of the deterrent and sublime values.

Poverty, therefore, becomes a factor that urges the poor to look for financial resources and equality, even through different means. Yet, there is another significant factor which may seem to be just the opposite of the previous one. Leisure and opulence also lead toward crimes of pleasure. According to Islamic teachings, these are considered crimes, though they may not be treated as such in other societies. These factors gain ground in the Kingdom among the youths who aspire to imitate the Western societies which are so deeply immersed in illegitimate pleasures.

Besides, there are some criminals who commit the crime under the impact of some psychological ailment, such as excitement, dual personality, or a sense of persecution and frustration. Under such a spell, the afflicted person commits crimes which normal people consider as unreasonable, but which he himself erroneously considers justified.

#### **III-effects of Development on Saudi Arabians**

One of the drawbacks of development plans has been the influx of expatriates from all nationalities, belonging especially to the labor class. This category brings with it its own customs and traditions. One of the negative effects of development plans, although much less important than the positive ones, is the rise in the various forms and methods of crime, mostly of a financial nature. According to statistics, 64 percent of crimes are committed by non-Saudis while their ratio, as compared to natives, does not exceed 10 to 25 percent.

#### **The Impact of Over 2 million Pilgrims**

During the Pilgrimage season, the Saudi Arabian government intensifies its security forces in the Western Province, in view of the great number of people coming in from all parts of the world for the Pilgrimage. This season sees a slight rise in the rate of crime which is normally of an ordinary nature, such as pickpocketing and fraud. This takes place owing to a huge crowd of people of different complexions speaking different languages. According to the Interior Ministry's reports, some people come during the Pilgrimage season for the purpose of pickpocketing and swindling. However, crimes of a more serious nature have also taken place, and Saudi statistics and statements have already indicated the non-receptivity of such crimes by Saudi Arabians. These crimes involve counterfeiting currency, and those involved in

such currencies fall a victim to the original promoters of the scheme.

There are also some other types of crimes committed during the Pilgrimage season, such as the forging of passports and entry visas. Such malpractices are carried out beyond the Saudi borders, but these criminals are apprehended at the country's inlets. This situation leads to an increase in the number of

detainees and suspects. However, the country's internal security statistics indicates no immoral crimes or murder cases during the Pilgrimage. Thus, Saudi Arabia is perhaps the only country in the world where such a mammoth gathering takes place in one month without the occurrence of penal crimes. But, of course, there is huge government spending to realize this objective.

## AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DISCUSSED

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 23 May 81 p 3

[Text] QATIF, May 22 (SPA) — Hasa Irrigation and Drainage Commission has reclaimed 3,800 donums of agricultural land which has been divided into 429 farms for various crops, officials reported Friday.

Muhammad Abdullah Abu Batin, the commission's director general, said 14 artesian wells of 150 meters deep were dug at the Qatif Agricultural Development Project. The commission also built 14 eight-meter high water tanks and 28 power generating plants, he said. There are 34,500 disposers built by the commission. They are divided into 60 main drainage lines apart from the old drainage network, Batin added.

The total length of new agricultural roads developed by the commission reached 33,000 meters. This includes 38 five-meter wide roads. The number of aqueducts along the roads reached 65, Batin said. Since 1980 the commission has been responsible for developing field drainage systems on newly reclaimed agricultural land and old farms which had been renovated. The total length of drainage channels reached 20,000 meters in April, 1981.

The internal drainage channels are cleaned three times annually to free them of obstacles. The estimated length of the regularly cleaned drainage system reaches 34,500 meters, Batin said. The project up-rooted about 14,700 neglected palm trees from an area of 530 donums, he added.

In the field of agricultural guidance, Batin said locally trained agricultural engineers were recruited by the commission's Guidance Department in the year 1979-80 to help farmers. The commission also provided agricultural machinery including tractors, seed, cultivators and motors.

Local farmers also were provided with various vegetable seeds and transplants produced by the commission at its Agricultural

Experiment Station in Qatif. In addition, farmers were given various types of fertilizers and insecticides. The Potato Farming Division has developed six experimental farms since 1979, Batin said.

The first phase of the Agricultural Development Project covered part of the old drainage systems built by the Agriculture and Water Ministry 20 years ago, Batin said. Roads have been developed on both sides of the drainage systems to facilitate maintenance operations. Cleaning operations on the drainage systems are carried out twice a year, he added.

He said that obstacles thrown into the drainage systems like junk cars, refrigerators and palm trees were removed, and drainage channels which were choked for years came into service again. The four main drainage systems cover an area of 4,000 hectares from Syhat in the south to Awamia in the north.

Batin said the commission cooperates with the Eastern Province Municipal and Rural Affairs Directorate in asphaltting and illuminating most of the agricultural roads alongside the drainage channels. The municipal and rural affairs directorate was provided with necessary drawings to specify the drainage systems' territories to prevent any problems, he added.

The commission has removed all buildings, walls or trees that didn't comply the Qatif agricultural development project's territories. The commission also has requested the electricity company in the region to remove all posts or transformers built on the project's land.

## OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS, LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS DISCUSSED

Paris LE MONDE in French 30 May 81 p 4

[Article by correspondent Michel Deure: "Opposition Movements Demand Recognition Prior to Legislative Elections"]

[Text] Tunis--The organization of early legislative elections before the end of this year, as decided by President Bourguiba (LE MONDE, 15 May), in order to enable the opposition to be represented in the Assembly, involves an amendment of the Tunisian constitution. The draft prepared on Tuesday 26 May by 50 deputies, which will very likely be adopted, does not conform to the present provisions of article 22 which provides that the Assembly is elected for five years: the draft would prematurely end the present legislature\* as it calls for elections to take place before 31 December.

The present laws contain no provision for the dissolution of the Assembly, except when a motion of censure is passed, which is absolutely excluded at present; they do not provide either for a resignation of the deputies, which had been considered for a time; the method adopted was, therefore, the only possible way to renew the Assembly and still remain within the bounds of legality. However, it may involve a few weeks' delay in the elections, which were originally scheduled for October, since, according to present procedures, all constitutional amendments must first be considered by a special committee, then adopted in the Assembly by a two-third majority after two readings separated by at least three months, before they are promulgated.

If the problem of early elections appears to have been solved, that of the recognition of political parties remains intact. Those in power have not yet made public the procedure they are contemplating, while those running--except for the Destourien Socialist Party (PSD)--have already stated that they demand to be recognized before the elections take place.

"We can only reject the notion of tying our recognition to the results of the next elections," Mr Mohamed Barmel, general secretary of the Tunisian communist party (PTT) stated. "It is antidemocratic and, in last analysis, is intended only to hinder the opposition and to make multipartyism meaningless."

Mr Barmel indicated that his party, which has had its activity only "suspended" since 1963, "is now ready to contribute in a responsible manner to the emergence and success of democratic change." Therefore, in addition to "an early recognition

\* The legislature was suspended in 1963 only in 1964.

of all political trends without any exception," the PCT is demanding the authorization to publish newspapers, the proclamation of a general amnesty, and a postponement of the coming elections to enable it to participate in them "with a minimum of preparation," the drafting of a new electoral law providing for proportional representation instead of the present system (single-ballot election by absolute majority, voting for several members and possibility to split the ticket).

Moreover, he feels that the "national charter" prepared by the PSD and to which all opposition movements must subscribe should be discussed by all the parties concerned. The latter point as well as the preliminary legal recognition of the political organizations before the elections is also mentioned by the Socialist Democratic Movement (MDS).

As for the political bureau of the Popular Unity Movement (MUP), the general secretary of which is Mr. Ahmed Ben Salah, it has the most intransigent position of all. Among other things, it demands a general amnesty, an end to repressive measures, the dissolution of emergency courts, a limitation to the close watch on individuals, and the repeal of all laws restricting the exercise of constitutional rights, especially those pertaining to freedom of speech, freedom of association and the right to strike. "Unless these improvements are made, the organization of elections would be mere propaganda intended to dupe the national and international public opinion while retaining the status quo," the MUP states in a recently released declaration.

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## DRYDOCK OFFER TO OAPEC DISCUSSED

London 8 DAYS In English 30 May 81 p 38

[Article by Annie King-Underwood]

[Text] THE OFFER to Oapex by the UAE oil minister, Dr Mana al Oteiba, to take over the \$500m Dubai drydock came as a shock to the world ship repairing industry. Even the British company C. H. Bailey was taken aback by the news as it was close to concluding three years of negotiations for the contract to run the drydock. Commented G. W. Dalgleish, director of C. H. Bailey: "We are still in the process of negotiating with the ruler of Dubai, and the last paper we received from there had 'final draft' written on it."

Surprisingly, the statement was made on behalf of the federal government of the UAE, until then the drydock was believed to be owned by the ruler of the Emirate of Dubai, Sheikh Rashid. When the offer was put forward at the Oapex oil ministers' conference in Kuwait in early May there was no indication that ownership had changed hands.

Sources in the UAE believe that Dr Oteiba was making a sounding rather than a firm offer. But financial circles see Sheikh Rashid's offloading of the drydock as part of his recent effort to clear up his foreign debts. He has reportedly paid off some \$2.7bn.

Sheikh Rashid reportedly approached a group of British companies in 1973 and told them: "Build me a drydock and ship repair complex second to none." A few weeks later consulting engineers Sir William Halcrow and Partners and the contractors, a joint venture of Costain and Taylor

Woodrow, started work. The docks were formally opened by Britain's Queen Elizabeth in February 1979. It is a massive project by any standards, involving unique design and construction features. Various problems have beset the project: a shortage of local labour, tight deadlines and cash limits and the dropping out of two operating companies at an early stage. In addition, the 1973 oil price rises undermined its economic viability.

The drydock can handle ultra large crude carriers (ULCCs) of up to one million deadweight tonnes. The first half of a ship's 25-year life is usually cheap and trouble-free, while the second half requires more expensive servicing. Most of the world's ships will be in the second part of their lifespan around 1985, so the demand for repair yards will be high. The drydock was also built on the assumption that tankers mothballed after 1973 would have to be returned to service in order to recoup the owners' investments.

Since its opening, the drydock has lain empty due to lack of managers and skilled workers. Business has been offered to the docks but so far they are not in a fit state to be in operation, commented Dalgleish.

In his offer to the Oapex ministers, Dr Oteiba suggested that the drydock should be operated by ASRY (Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard) which is jointly owned by Oapex members and to which the Dubai project offered direct competition. Oapex ministers agreed to set up a two-member ministerial committee from Bahrain and the UAE to study the proposal. An ASRY spokesman in London said this week that no decision had been reached. Bahrain's minister of development and industry was quoted in *Arab Report and Memo* as saying

What is important is that the UAE has taken over the dock from the Emirate of Dubai and ASRY is being asked to run it.'

Another decision taken in Kuwait was the approval of a ministerial committee's report on the construction of two drydocks at Mersel Kebir in Algeria, with 70,000 ton and 150,000 ton capacities.

Approval was given despite comments in December by ASRY's chairman, Sheikh Mohammed al Khalifa, who represents Bahrain on the company's board of directors. The Oapee bulletin reported him as saying that the international market situation did not encourage the establishment of a second drydock in Algeria. Although the project remained under consideration, he said, a decision to go ahead was being postponed until market conditions changed.

A surplus in drydock capacity continues to dominate the world ship repair market, leading to great competition and a drop in repair charges,' he commented. 'Conditions will worsen if huge drydocks continue to be built as they will suffer long-term losses.'

A feasibility study for the Algerian drydocks, completed in 1980 by the British company Rendel, Palmer and Tritton, estimated the cost at \$400m. Shipping sources dismiss fears that the two docks will be uneconomical because of over-capacity in the Mediterranean, as evidenced by the empty Chinese-built drydock in Malta.

Algeria has a substantial dry cargo and LNG fleet of its own, and has sufficient labour to run drydocks, unlike the Gulf states which have to import the manpower. In addition, the widening of the Suez Canal means that more large tankers will return through the Mediterranean, and Algerian drydocks would be well-placed.



## WESTERN SAHARA

### POLISARIO'S PROGRESS AGAINST MOROCCO REVIEWED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 10 Apr 81 p 25

/Article by Hasan Hammadah: "Another Chad in Africa, If Mauritania and Polisario Unite!"/

/Text/ Have Mauritania and the Polisario government reached the stage of preparing to establish a union between the two countries? What will be the effect of this union on the Morocco-Saharan war, Algiers' relations with Rabat, and Libya's relations with Algeria?

Where does the unsuccessful coup stand with regard to this plan?

Will Mauritania turn into a new Chad?

A Senegalese diplomat who closely follows the details of affairs in the region posed these questions to me. He said, "Former President Leopold Senghor was serious when he declared that if Nouakchott fell into the hands of Polisario, he would request that the Mauritanian bank of the Senegal river dividing his country from Mauritania be taken over."

The diplomat went on to say, "The present merger plan is behind all the developments which have occurred in Mauritania, beginning with the coup that removed the former president, Mukhtar Ould Daddah, on 10 July 1978, ending with the coup attempt which did not succeed last month, and passing through the 5 August 1979 Algiers agreement in which Mauritania recognized the government of the Sahara Republic -- Polisario."

The transformation which has occurred in Mauritania's situation may be summarized as follows: the first coup, against Mukhtar Ould Daddah, was aimed at removing Mauritania from the struggle going on over the Sahara. When it appeared that Col Ould Salik was still in sympathy with previous policy and that the ruling military junta did not consist of more than opposing wings, he was eliminated and his place was taken by Col Ahmad Ould Yusuf, who was killed in a plane crash on 22 May 1979. The place of the latter was temporarily taken by Ahmad Salim Ould Sidi, a leader of last month's unsuccessful coup, who was executed along with his comrade Ould 'Abd-al-Qadir on the morning of Thursday last 26 March; he was entitled to the "succession," according to the chain of responsibility, but

Col Khouna Ould Haidalla exerted intense pressure to remove him for the premiership, since Ould Sidi was not in sympathy with the policy of an opening toward Polisario.

Here a shift in the command in Nouakchott in favor of the current calling for an alliance with the Sahara Republic revolutionaries who are hostile to Morocco began to appear.

After he split off in 1980 from the command, Ould Sidi did not hide the fact that his colleagues in the ruling military junta had compelled him to go to Algiers to sign the treaty with Polisario. He said, "They compelled me to go to sign the treaty with the objective of damaging my reputation, especially since many military people consider that this agreement (on which no negotiations took place) was tantamount to a defeat and capitulation to Polisario."

It is well known that these agreements contain two stipulations: the first, which is open, containing a renunciation by Mauritania of all claims on the Sahara (one should bear in mind that its demands were stiffer than Morocco's), and the second, which is secret, by which the government of Mauritania commits itself immediately to hand over the portion of the Sahara which the Mauritania obtained by virtue of the Madrid treaty of 14 November 1975 to Polisario.

Thus the current calling for an understanding with Polisario and a refusal to deal with Morocco won -- the Algiers agreement was obtained without Morocco's participation and against its will, and Mauritania came to consider that the issue of the Western Sahara had ended.

Along with this shift, Polisario gradually moved over to the offensive, after it had been in a defensive situation, and Mauritania gradually became a basic Polisario target, although any effectiveness that the wing hostile to the Saharans in command in Nouakchott had had ended.

It is true that Polisario had previously struck at the heart of the capital, Nouakchott, in June 1976, but this blow occurred at a time when the struggle was at its most intense. Today, however, after Mauritania has started a policy of actual opening up toward the Saharans, diplomatic circles have been surprised by Polisario's claims on the northern region of Mauritania. These actually were made early last February, and it appears that a basic group in the regime in Nouakchott is very enthusiastic about a merger between the two peoples. The negative answer Polisario received from Nouakchott regarding the merger of the northern territories did not affect the rapprochement which had occurred between the two governments. Thus, for example, the Mauritanian government delegated its minister of information, Mr Muhammad Ould Sidi Hanena, to represent it in the fifth anniversary celebrations of the founding of the Saharan Republic, and the speech he gave on the occasion, from the standpoint of commitment, transcended speeches which the representatives of Libya and Algeria gave. There are important reasons for this. The territories of Mauritania have come to constitute a springboard for aggression by the Polisario group, which is exploiting the support of the dominant wing in power in Mauritania to eliminate accounts within Mauritania. Last 13 January a Saharan group came into one of the outskirts of the capital, Nouakchott, in three Land Rovers, kidnapped

six Mauritanian subjects who were cooperating with Polisario, and led them far into the desert. So far the Nouakchott government has not been able to get its subjects released -- one should bear in mind that three of them belong to the Haidalla tribe.

The fact is that Mauritania is internally divided into three groups, the group from the south, including Ahmad Salim Ould Sidi (grandson of the Prince of Taraza), then the group from the east, concentrated near the southern borders of Mali, including Col 'Abd-al-Qadir, and the people of the north, to whom the strong man of the regime, Col Ould Haidalla, belongs, of which the two former groups are severe enemies. Power has in reality come into the grip of the northerners, who are linked to the Polisario tribes by deep-rooted blood ties. It is the intense distaste between the people of the north and the south which prompted the people who mounted the coup to make an attempt to stop the planned merger between Mauritania and Polisario.

While the information which holds that Morocco is behind the unsuccessful coup is correct, the Libyans had previously moved groups to make an unsuccessful coup, as well, on 24 December 1980. Therefore there is no room for amazement that the experts who have started arriving in Nouakchott are Algerian subjects or that the Algerian government is permitted to monopolize the management of the Mauritanian crisis.

This situation dominating Mauritania largely resembles Chad from the standpoint of the deep enmity between the people of the north and the south, which permits foreign interventions to occur.

The merger plan between the two countries, Mauritania and the Sahara, could lead to the outbreak of civil war between the north and the south and could affect the course of the Morocco-Saharan war and relations between Algiers and Rabat and Tripoli and Algiers. The situation is extremely complex and foreign intervention forebodes grave developments. Perhaps relations not just between progressives and conservatives in Morocco but even among the progressive themselves have been ruptured.

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